

## Agenda – Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol

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Lleoliad:	I gael rhagor o wybodaeth cysylltwch a:
Ystafell Bwyllgora 1 – y Senedd	Gareth Williams
Dyddiad: Dydd Llun, 17 Gorffennaf 2017	Clerc y Pwyllgor 0300 200 6362
Amser: 11.00	<a href="mailto:SeneddMCD@cynulliad.cymru">SeneddMCD@cynulliad.cymru</a>

### 1 Cyflwyniad, ymddiheuriadau, dirprwyon a datganiadau o fuddiant

### 2 Offerynnau nad ydynt yn cynnwys materion i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.2 na 21.3

11.00

(Tudalennau 1 – 2)

CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 1 – Offerynnau statudol sydd ag adroddiadau clir

Offerynnau'r Weithdrefn Penderfyniad Negyddol

SL(5)113 – Rheoliadau Addysg (Arolygu Ysgolion) (Cymru) (Diwygio) 2017

SL(5)115 – Gorchymyn Twbercwlosis (Cymru) (Diwygio) 2017

SL(5)116 – Rheoliadau Cynllunio Gofal ac Adolygu Achosion (Diwygiadau Amrywiol) (Cymru) 2017

### 3 Offerynnau nad ydynt yn cynnwys materion i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.2 na 21.3 ond sydd â goblygiadau o ganlyniad i'r DU yn gadael yr UE

11.05



Cynulliad  
Cenedlaethol  
Cymru

National  
Assembly for  
Wales

**SL(5)114 – Rheoliadau Addysg (Benthyciadau at Radd Feistr Ôl–raddedig) (Cymru)  
(Diwygio) 2017**

(Tudalen 3)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 2 – Adroddiad**

**SL (5) 117 – Rheoliadau Llaeth Ysgol (Cymru) 2017**

(Tudalen 4)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 3 – Adroddiad**

## **4 Papurau i'w nodi**

11.10

**Ymchwiliad Llais Cryfach i Gymru: Llythyr gan yr Athro Jonathan Bradbury**

(Tudalennau 5 – 8)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 4 – Llythyr gan yr Athro Jonathan Bradbury**

**Ymchwiliad Llais Cryfach i Gymru: Llythyr gan y Constitution Society**

(Tudalennau 9 – 10)

**CLA(5)19–17 – Papur 5 – Llythyr gan y Constitution Society**

**Datganiad gan Ysgrifennydd y Cabinet dros yr Economi a'r Seilwaith: Polisi a  
Deddfwriaeth yr Amgylchedd Hanesyddol**

(Tudalennau 11 – 13)

**CLA(5)19–17 – Papur 6 – Datganiad gan Ysgrifennydd y Cabinet dros yr Economi  
a'r Seilwaith**

**Llythyr gan y Cwnsler Cyffredinol: Y Cod Erlyn**

(Tudalennau 14 – 16)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 7 – Llythyr gan y Cwnsler Cyffredinol, 30 Mehefin 2017**

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 8 – Llythyr i'r Cwnsler Cyffredinol, 16 Mehefin 2017**

**Cytundeb ysgrifenedig ynghylch Cysylltiadau rhyng-lywodraethol rhwng Senedd yr Alban a Llywodraeth yr Alban**

(Tudalennau 17 – 20)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 9 – Cytundeb ysgrifenedig ynghylch Cysylltiadau rhyng-lywodraethol rhwng Senedd yr Alban a Llywodraeth yr Alban**

**Datganiad ysgrifenedig gan y Prif Weinidog, Bil Ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd**

(Tudalennau 21 – 23)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 10 – Datganiad ysgrifenedig gan y Prif Weinidog, Bil Ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd**

**Datganiad ar y cyd gan Brif Weinidogion Cymru a'r Alban mewn ymateb i Fil Ymadael â'r UE**

(Tudalennau 24 – 25)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 11 – Datganiad ar y cyd gan Brif Weinidogion Cymru a'r Alban mewn ymateb i Fil Ymadael â'r UE**

**Bil Ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd – Memorandwm yn ymwneud â'r Pwerau Dirprwyedig yn y Bil ar gyfer y Pwyllgor Pwerau Dirprwyedig a Diwygio Rheoleiddio**

(Tudalennau 26 – 83)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 12 – Bil Ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd – Memorandwm yn ymwneud â'r Pwerau Dirprwyedig yn y Bil ar gyfer y Pwyllgor Pwerau Dirprwyedig a Diwygio Rheoleiddio**

**Yr Adran dros Adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd: Taflen Ffeithiau y Bil Diddymu 5:**  
**Datganoli**

(Tudalennau 84 – 85)

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 13** - Yr Adran dros Adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd: Taflen Ffeithiau y Bil Diddymu 5: Datganoli

## **5 Gohebiaeth ynghylch gweithredu Deddf Cymru 2017**

11.15

(Tudalennau 86 – 88)

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 14** – Llythyr gan y Llywydd, Gweithredu Deddf Cymru 2017, 11 Gorffennaf 2017

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 15** – Llythyr gan yr Ysgrifennydd Gwladol, Gweithredu Deddf Cymru 2017, 10 Gorffennaf 2017

## **6 Cynnig o dan Reol Sefydlog 17.42 i benderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o'r cyfarfod ar gyfer y busnes a ganlyn:**

11.20

## **7 Llais Cryfach i Gymru: Y prif faterion**

(Tudalennau 89 – 122)

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 16** – Prif Faterion

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 17** – Crynodeb o'r dystiolaeth

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 18** – Diweddariad ynghylch statws argymhellion Adroddiad Silk

**CLA(5)-19-17 – Papur 19** – Crynodeb wedi'i ddiweddarau ynghylch adroddiadau pwyllgorau eraill y DU ar gysylltiadau rhwng-lywodraethol a rhyng-sefydliadol

## **8 Panel Dinasyddion**

(Tudalennau 123 – 127)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 20 – Ymgysylltu â dinasyddion Cymru yn y dyfodol**

## **9 Trafodaeth am yr ohebiaeth ynghylch gweithredu Deddf Cymru 2017**

(Tudalennau 128 – 130)

**CLA(5)–19–17 – Papur 21– Nodyn Cyngor Cyfreithiol 1**

## **10 Briff ar Fil Ymadael â'r UE**

**Dyddiad y cyfarfod nesaf**

**18 Medi 2017**

SL(5)113 – Rheoliadau Addysg (Arolygu Ysgolion) (Cymru)  
(Diwygio) 2017

**Gweithdrefn: Negyddol**

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Mae Deddf Addysg 2005 ("Deddf 2005") yn nodi'r fframwaith statudol ar gyfer arolygu ysgolion. Mae Deddf 2005 yn gadael llawer o'r manylion i'w rhagnodi yn y Rheoliadau. Mae Rheoliadau Addysg (Arolygu Ysgolion) (Cymru) 2006 ("Rheoliadau 2006") yn nodi llawer o'r manylion hynny.

Mae Paragraff 6 o Atodlen 4 i Ddeddf 2005 yn ei gwneud yn ofynnol i'r awdurdod priodol (a ddiffinnir yn adran 43 o Ddeddf 2005) ar gyfer yr ysgol gynnal cyfarfod rhwng yr arolygydd sy'n cynnal yr arolygiad a rhieni y disgyblion cofrestredig yn yr ysgol. Mae Rheoliad 8 o Rheoliadau 2006 yn rhagnodi manylion y trefniadau ar gyfer y cyfarfod hwnnw. Yn benodol mae rheoliad 8(a) yn darparu bod yn rhaid cynnal cyfarfod cyn yr amser y mae'r arolygiad i fod i ddechrau. Mae'r Rheoliadau hyn yn diwygio rheoliad 8(a) fel bod yn rhaid i'r cyfarfod gael ei gynnal heb fod yn hwyrach na diwedd yr ail ddiwrnod gwaith ar ôl i'r arolygiad ddechrau (rheoliad 2).

**Deddf Wreiddiol:** Deddf Addysg 2005

**Fe'u gwnaed ar:** 27 Mehefin 2017

**Fe'u gosodwyd ar:** 30 Mehefin 2017

**Yn dod i rym ar:** 1 Medi 2017



## SL(5)115 – Gorchymyn Twbercwlosis (Cymru) (Diwygio) 2017

### Gweithdrefn: Negyddol

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Mae'r Gorchymyn hwn yn diwygio Gorchymyn Twbercwlosis (Cymru) 2010 (OS 2010/1379) i wneud nifer o ddiwygiadau technegol; hefyd i roi i Weinidogion Cymru y pwerau i weithredu rheolaethau ychwanegol i atal lledaeniad Twbercwlosis ac yn benodol, rhag iddo ymsefydlu mewn ardaloedd o Gymru sy'n gymharol rhydd o'r clefyd.

**Deddf Wreiddiol:** Deddf Iechyd Anifeiliaid 1981

**Fe'i gwnaed ar:** 27 Mehefin 2017

**Fe'i gosodwyd ar:** 30 Mehefin 2017

**Yn dod i rym ar:** 1 Hydref 2017

## SL(5)116 – Rheoliadau Cynllunio Gofal ac Adolygu Achosion (Diwygiadau Amrywiol) (Cymru) 2017

### Gweithdrefn: Negyddol neu Gadarnhaol

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Mae'r Rheoliadau hyn yn diwygio Rheoliadau Adolygu Achosion Plant (Cymru) 2007, Rheoliadau Gofal a Chymorth (Cynllunio Gofal) (Cymru) 2015 a Rheoliadau Cynllunio Gofal, Lleoli ac Adolygu Achosion (Cymru) 2015. Mae'r diwygiadau yn gwneud darpariaeth ynghylch cynllunio ac adolygu gofal a chymorth ar gyfer pobl sy'n rhan o deulu sy'n cael cymorth gan dîm Integredig Cymorth i Deuluoedd, boed o dan Ddeddf Gwasanaethau Cymdeithasol a Llesiant (Cymru) 2014, neu o dan Ddeddf Plant 1989.

**Deddf Wreiddiol:** Deddf Plant 1989

**Fe'u gwnaed ar:** 26 Mehefin 2017

**Fe'u gosodwyd ar:** 30 Mehefin 2017

**Yn dod i rym ar:** 23 Gorffennaf 2017



# SL(5)114 – Rheoliadau Addysg (Benthyciadau) at Radd Feistr Ôl-raddedig (Cymru) (Diwygio) 2017

## Item 3.1

### Cefndir a Phwrrpas

Mae Rheoliadau Addysg (Benthyciadau) at Radd Feistr Ôl-raddedig (Cymru) (Diwygio) 2017 ("Rheoliadau 2017") yn darparu ar gyfer gwneud benthyciadau i fyfyrwyr sy'n preswyl fel arfer yng Nghymru ar gyfer cyrsiau gradd feistr ôl-raddedig sy'n dechrau ar 1 Awst 2017 neu ar ôl hynny.

Mae rheoliad 3 yn diwygio rheoliad 3 o Reoliadau 2017 er mwyn galluogi Gweinidogion Cymru, mewn rhai amgylchiadau, i farnu bod person sydd wedi cael benthyciad at radd feistr ôl-raddedig o dan Reoliadau 2017 neu fenthyciad (ac eithrio o dan Reoliadau 2017) mewn perthynas â chwrs gradd feistr ôl-raddedig gan awdurdod llywodraeth yn y Deyrnas Unedig yn gymwys i gael cymorth o dan Reoliadau 2017.

### Y weithdrefn

Negyddol

### Materion technegol: craffu

Ni nodwyd unrhyw bwyntiau i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.2 mewn perthynas â'r offeryn hwn.

### Craffu ar rinweddau

Ni nodir unrhyw bwyntiau i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.3 mewn perthynas â'r offeryn hwn.

### Goblygiadau sy'n deillio o adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd

I wneud cais am fenthyciad gradd meistr ôl-raddedig, rhaid i fyfyrwyr fod yn fyfyrwyr cymwys. Mae Rheoliadau 2017 yn rhestru pob categori o fyfyrwyr cymwys; mae un categori yn cynnwys "dinasyddion yr UE".

Nid yw'n glir pa gymorth ariannol a fydd ar gael i fyfyrwyr sy'n wladolion yr UE ar ôl i'r DU adael yr UE.

### Ymateb y Llywodraeth

Nid oes angen ymateb y llywodraeth.

### Cynghorwyr Cyfreithiol

**Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol**  
**4 Gorffennaf 2017**





# Item 13.2 Rheoliadau Llaeth Ysgol (Cymru) 2017

## Cefndir a Phwrrpas

Mae'r Rheoliadau hyn yn diddymu ac yn disodli Rheoliadau Llaeth Ysgol (Cymru) 2008 ('Rheoliadau 2008') OS 2008/2141, yn sgîl newidiadau yn nghyfraith yr UE i ganiatáu parhad cynllun llaeth ysgol yr Undeb Ewropeaidd yng Nghymru pan fydd cynllun llaeth ysgol newydd yr UE o dan Reoliad (UE) Rhif 1308/2013, Rheoliad Gweithredu'r Comisiwn (EU) 2017/39 a Rheoliad Dirprwyedig y Comisiwn (EU) 2017/40 yn dod i rym o 1 Awst 2017.

Yn benodol, bydd y Rheoliadau hyn yn caniatáu i'r Asiantaeth Taliadau Gwledig (ar ran Gweinidogion Cymru) barhau i weinyddu'r cynlluniau taliadau cymorth cenedlaethol yng Nghymru ac yn cael effaith gyfatebol â darpariaethau Rheoliadau 2008. Hefyd, byddant yn darparu pwerau mynediad ac arolygu penodol i Weinidogion Cymru (drwy Arolygiaeth Wledig Cymru) i hwyluso gorfodi'r cynllun llaeth ysgol, fel sy'n ofynnol gan rwymedigaethau'r UE.

## Y weithdrefn

Negyddol

## Materion technegol: craffu

Ni nodwyd unrhyw bwyntiau i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.2 mewn perthynas â'r offeryn hwn.

## Craffu ar rinweddau

Ni nodir unrhyw bwyntiau i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.3 mewn perthynas â'r offeryn hwn.

## Goblygiadau sy'n deillio o adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd

Mae'r offeryn hwn yn cael ei wneud gan Weinidogion Cymru gan ddefnyddio pwerau a roddwyd iddynt yn Neddf y Cymunedau Ewropeaidd 1972 ('Deddf 1972') mewn perthynas â pholisi amaethyddol cyffredin yr Undeb Ewropeaidd mewn perthynas â bwyd (gan gynnwys diod). Nid yw'n glir sut y bydd camau o dan bolisi o'r fath yn arferadwy pan fydd y DU yn gadael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd. Ar hyn o bryd, fodd bynnag, gallai methiant i gyflwyno deddfwriaeth yng Nghymru sy'n adlewyrchu'r newidiadau ar unwaith i ddeddfwriaeth yr UE ac i hwyluso gorfodaeth y Cynllun Llaeth Ysgol arwain at achos am dorri cyfraith Ewropeaidd.

## Ymateb y Llywodraeth

Nid oes angen ymateb y llywodraeth.

## Cynghorwyr Cyfreithiol

### Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol

10 Gorffennaf 2017



Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru | National Assembly for Wales

Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol | Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee

Ymchwiliad: Llais cryfach i Gymru: ymgysylltu â San Steffan a'r sefydliadau datganoledig |

Inquiry: A stronger voice for Wales: engaging with Westminster and the devolved institutions

Ymateb gan: Yr Athro J.P. Bradbury, Prifysgol Abertawe

Response from: Dr J.P. Bradbury, Swansea University

## 1. Swansea University and Work on Parliamentary Studies

Work on Parliamentary Studies in Swansea University is concentrated in the Department of Political and Cultural Studies. This comprises taught courses and research.

**Taught courses:** The Department has run a final year undergraduate module entitled *The National Assembly for Wales* (PO-3000) since 2005. This provides lectures, seminars and guest speakers on the Assembly; arranging placements for students with AMs; and supervising students in the preparation of their essay and policy report assignments. The module is year-long and typically has c20 students on it. The Department also has run a final year undergraduate module entitled *Parliamentary Studies* (PO-3121) since 2013. This has been convened under contract with the UK Parliament. It comprises a class schedule, including academic lectures; presentations and Q and A by parliamentary officers from the Commons, an MP and Peer; mock select committee evidence giving exercises; and a Westminster field trip. This module is always run in the first teaching block with around 25–30 students, and we then have a follow-on module, *Dissertation in Parliamentary Studies* (POA301) in the second teaching block. This enables students to focus on a particular aspect of parliamentary studies.

**Research:** Parliamentary studies and representation are key themes of research in the *Political Analysis and Governance Research Group*. My own research (Professor Jonathan Bradbury) has included constitutional development of devolution in Wales; electoral and party politics in Wales; and UK and European comparative research projects (inc Wales) on multi-level

politics and how MPs and AMs approach representation. **Dr Bettina Petersohn** researches on inter-parliamentary relations in multi-level political systems, notably Germany and the UK; **Dr Ekaterina Kolpinskaya** researches on religion, black and minority ethnic political agendas and representation in the UK Parliament; and **Dr Dion Curry** researches on legitimacy and multi-level governance with particular emphasis on EU governance and Wales. **Dr Matthew Wall** conducts part of his research on political parties in Wales, and through voter advice websites he has sought to engage voters and school pupils with understanding what parties stand for as they approach voting contexts.

## **2. The Role for Welsh Universities in improving understanding of Welsh devolution across the UK**

I believe that the Welsh Universities could play much more of a role in helping to improve knowledge and understanding of Welsh devolution across the UK. I think there are two key arenas through which Welsh universities can channel their expertise in a collaborative way.

**Institute for Government:** First, at the UK level, and specifically aiming at UK civil servants there is the Institute for Government. The IFG was established to provide training and advice for UK civil servants and policy makers, which could incorporate officials and policy makers from across the UK. It is likely that a greater Welsh university input into the IFG would improve knowledge and understanding of Welsh devolution at the UK centre.

**Learned Society for Wales:** Secondly, a key arena through which greater collaboration might be stimulated is the Learned Society for Wales. This has the ambition to promote knowledge and understanding of Wales generally, and has a track record specifically of holding conferences and initiating reports in the areas of social science research in Wales and devolution, including in conjunction with the British Academy. An imaginative vision might include the LSW taking the initiative to bring together university expertise to produce publications, briefing reports and events, perhaps even held on an annual basis, to promote awareness of the Assembly. Invitees could include officials, representatives, journalists and opinion formers from

across the UK. An annual 'Hay in the Bay' Assembly event might be a popular winner.

### **3. Relationships with Other UK Universities and promoting understanding of Welsh devolution**

**Parliamentary Studies Lecturers Network:** There are nearly twenty universities that provide the Parliamentary Studies module (see above) under contract with the UK Parliament. Over the last few years the convenors across the universities have formed a Parliamentary Studies lecturers' network. This has an annual meeting in Westminster with members of the UK Parliament Education service and Clerks and Committee specialists, the most recent of which was held on 15 June. It has a powerful potential for disseminating knowledge of any Parliamentary studies topic across Universities to academic staff and their students in university courses, as well as to UK parliamentary staff and members through events that the network can hold in Westminster. As the Convenor of the Swansea version of the module we could put more thought to making use of this network in developing understanding of devolution in Wales across the UK.

**PSA Territorial Politics Specialist Group:** Since 1994 I have also been the Convenor of the Territorial Politics Specialist Group of the UK Political Studies Association. This has just over a hundred members, who are active researchers on issues related to nationalism, devolution, constitutional change, party and electoral politics, and public policy and intergovernmental relations. Research is both UK-focused and comparative. The work of the specialist group gives rise to two sets of relationships. First, I and my colleagues in the group across the UK are a source of expertise for the *Politics teacher section of the PSA*. This includes an annual politics conference for teachers and pupils, a schedule of school talks and a series of topic guides on all subjects, to which members of the group can contribute. I have recently published a topic guide on nationalism for use by the teacher section in preparing to teach the revised A-Level Politics syllabus. It is perfectly possible to work through these UK-wide relationships to develop talks and written texts promoting understanding of Welsh devolution in schools. Secondly, the PSA Territorial Politics Group is a source of

**networking among research groups and centres** on research themes covered by the group. These include the Political Analysis and Governance RG in Swansea; the Wales Governance Centre in Cardiff; the Institutes of Governance in both Edinburgh and Belfast; and the Constitution Unit in University College London; as well as several centres for regional and local research in English universities. These institutions all have knowledge transfer arrangements that enable contact with both elite level policy makers and interest group and general public arenas. They provide a potential network of platforms for promoting understanding and discussing issues relating to Welsh devolution.

#### **4. Other Matters**

The principal further initiative to bring to your attention is the work of the **Study of Parliament Group, Welsh section**, on developing a book-length publication on the National Assembly for Wales. The defining character of the SPG is that it brings together Assembly officials and academics researching on the Assembly to foster dialogue and mutual understanding. The Welsh section has recently met twice a year at the Assembly and has formulated a plan to produce an edited book to act as a reference work on the Assembly, informed both by academic research and practitioner insight. Preparation of the volume is at an early stage but when it is finished it could provide a valuable resource for public officials in Wales, as well as indeed all parts of the UK and beyond, and provide a key reference work for anyone who has a responsibility to explain or understand how the Assembly works and what it does.

I hope that this provides some useful information and ideas to contribute to your work. If you would like me to amplify on any part of what I have written about here I would be happy to do so.

Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru | National Assembly for Wales

Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol | Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee

Ymchwiliad: Llais cryfach i Gymru: ymgysylltu â San Steffan a'r sefydliadau datganoledig |

Inquiry: A stronger voice for Wales: engaging with Westminster and the devolved institutions

Ymateb gan: The Constitution Society

Response from: The Constitution Society

The Constitution Society is an educational charity that promotes awareness of constitutional issues. It is not affiliated to any party. As part of its interest in constitutional affairs, it engages with issues connected to parliaments and legislatures, and to devolution.

### **– Are there any barriers to engagement with the National Assembly?**

The Constitution Society engagement with legislatures is primarily of an informal nature. The Society takes part in events in the Westminster Parliament, or it holds events outside the Parliament to which it invites parliamentarians and parliamentary staff either as speakers or guests. For practical reasons, since the Society is based in London, there is likely to be more engagement with the Westminster Parliament than other institutions.

The Society does not generally in its current mode of operation provide evidence to parliamentary inquiries at any level; though it would not rule out doing so in future, including the Welsh Assembly.

The Society emphasises the importance of the constitutional position of Wales and its relationship to the overall constitutional system of the UK.

### **– What is your perception of the process for engaging with committees in Cardiff compared to London, Edinburgh or Belfast?**

The Society has not engaged specifically with committees in the National Assembly for Wales, but does not perceive that there would be any particular difficulties in doing so if the occasion arose.

**– What is your perception and expectation of inter-institutional working and relationships, and your thoughts on learning from other institutions?**

No specific views.

## **STATEMENT BY THE WELSH GOVERNMENT**

**TITLE Historic Environment Policy and Legislation**

**DATE 4 July 2017**

**BY Ken Skates AM, Cabinet Secretary for Economy and Infrastructure**

A little more than a year ago the first Wales-only legislation for the historic environment received Royal Assent and became law. Since then, the greater part of the Historic Environment (Wales) Act 2016 has been brought into force, and an impressive body of supporting policy, advice and best-practice guidance has been published. It is an appropriate time to take stock of what we have achieved and what lies ahead.

The 2016 Act has placed Wales at the forefront of the UK nations in the protection and management of the historic environment. For instance, following the commencement of the relevant provisions at the end of May, Wales alone can claim statutory historic environment records for each local authority area. They provide local authorities, developers and others with the essential information that they need to reach well-informed decisions on the management of the historic environment. They also play an important role in helping people to learn more about and engage with the local historic environment. The legislation has given these vital records a stable future and their importance has been underscored by statutory guidance for public bodies.

Wales also now boasts the only statutory list of historic place names in the UK, and perhaps the world. The list included nearly 350,000 entries at its launch in early May. It will raise public awareness of the importance of these elements of our national heritage and encourage their continuing use by individuals and public bodies. Specific instructions on the use of the list in naming and renaming streets and properties have been included in statutory guidance.

We are also leading the way in making the processes for scheduling a monument or listing a building more open, transparent and accountable. Owners and occupiers must now be formally consulted before a designation is made, and, importantly, historic sites are given protection during this period of consultation. Owners have also been given a right to request a review of that decision, which would be undertaken by the Planning Inspectorate.

The 2016 Act has also provided a range of new or refined tools to give increased protection to our precious historic assets. For example, we have made it easier for local planning authorities to undertake urgent works to deteriorating listed buildings and, crucially, have reduced the financial risk by making any costs a local land



charge. We have closed loopholes in existing legislation that hindered efforts to prosecute individuals who seriously harmed scheduled monuments through unauthorised works or malicious destruction.

Of course, it is far better to prevent damage in the first place, so we have developed alongside the legislation a new web resource, Cof Cymru — National Historic Assets of Wales, to give owners, occupiers and members of the public free, authoritative information on the description, location and extent of designated and registered historic assets across Wales.

From the outset of the legislative process, we recognised that the 2016 Act would need to be supplemented by up-to-date planning policy and advice for the historic environment that reflected not only the provisions of the Act but also current conservation philosophy and practice. I have worked with the Cabinet Secretary for Environment and Rural Affairs in the production of a revised historic environment chapter for *Planning Policy Wales*, and the first technical advice note, or TAN, for the Welsh historic environment. TAN 24 covers all aspects of the management of the historic environment within the planning system and has replaced a number of outdated Welsh Office circulars.

These measures are being complemented by best-practice guidance that will help local authorities, the third sector, developers and owners and occupiers to manage the historic environment carefully and sustainably for the benefit of present and future generations. The first nine titles appeared in May and are available from the Cadw website. They include the management of World Heritage Sites and historic parks and gardens and advice on the preparation of lists of historic assets of special local interest and tackling listed buildings at risk.

While we can be justifiably proud of our achievements in the year since the Historic Environment (Wales) Act became law, there is still work to be done. During the passage of the legislation, concern was expressed across the Chamber about listed buildings that had been allowed to fall into disrepair. This led to an amendment that will give local authorities the powers to take additional action to secure the proper preservation of such buildings.

However, any regulations that we introduce must be genuinely useful to local authorities and contribute positively to the resolution of the complex challenges presented by decaying listed buildings. We have commissioned research that will provide a sound evidence base for our proposals for regulations. This is an opportunity to find a way forward for many buildings that are blighting our communities, but we will need the input of stakeholders across the historic environment sector to shape effective legislation.

The Act's provisions for heritage partnership agreements also remain to be commenced. These agreements, which have been greeted with enthusiasm in the sector, will support the consistent long-term management of scheduled monuments and listed buildings. They will benefit both owners and consenting authorities by embodying the necessary consents for agreed routine works. Since these agreements will last for a number of years, it is important that the regulations and guidance are well-founded and practical. We are therefore seeking partners for pilot schemes to inform further progress.

Work to bring the statutory register of historic parks and gardens into effect is well underway. A review of the boundaries of the almost 400 parks and gardens on the existing non-statutory register has been undertaken. All known owners/occupiers of registered historic parks and gardens will be notified of the boundaries of the registered areas during the remainder of 2017 and early 2018. Once that notification process is complete, the statutory register will be brought into force.

Finally, we come to the Act's provisions for the Advisory Panel for the Welsh Historic Environment. Assembly Members will recall that at the end of last year I convened the Historic Wales Steering Group to undertake a review of heritage services in Wales. Following their recommendations, I asked for a business case examining the options for the future governance arrangements for Cadw, including potential legislative implications. Until I have received that business case and taken a decision on Cadw's future, it would be premature to consider the detailed arrangements for the Advisory Panel.

During the scrutiny of what was then the Historic Environment (Wales) Bill, many here voiced their desire to consolidate the legislation for the historic environment to give Wales a single, bilingual body of law accessible and comprehensible to practitioners and public alike. Therefore, I am delighted that, in recent evidence to the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, the Counsel General has identified the historic environment legislation as a suitable pilot for the Welsh Government's ambitious programme to consolidate and codify the law for Wales. Building on the work that we have already done, this represents an exciting opportunity to make Wales the envy of the UK nations.

The activity I have outlined here today will provide a coherent foundation for improved protection and management of the historic environment for generations to come. It recognises the significant contribution that the historic environment makes to the economic prosperity of our nation and the well-being of its citizens, and its importance in fostering the 'quality of place' and the pride and resilience of communities.

Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

Mr Huw Irranca-Davies AC  
Cadeirydd  
Y Pwyllgor Materion  
Cyfansoddiadol a  
Deddfwriaethol  
Cynulliad Cenedlaethol  
Cymru  
Bae Caerdydd, CF99 1NA

30 Mehefin 2017

Annwyl Huw,

Diolch ichi am eich llythyr dyddiedig 16 Mehefin sy'n mynegi pryderon y Pwyllgor ynghylch peth o'r iaith a ddefnyddir yng Nghod Erlyn Llywodraeth Cymru.

Cynhelir yr ymgynghoriad ar God Erlyn Llywodraeth Cymru er mwyn ceisio barn eang. Rwy'n ddiolchgar, felly, i'r Pwyllgor am ei sylwadau. Bydd y cyfnod ymgynghori yn dod i ben ar 16 Awst a gallaf gadarnhau y bydd y Cod yn cael ei adolygu ymhellach wedi hynny, gan ystyried barn y Pwyllgor a'r holl ymatebion eraill a dderbyniwyd.

Yn gywir,

Mick Antoniw AC/AM  
Cwnsler Cyffredinol  
Counsel General

Mick Antoniw AC  
Cwnsler Cyffredinol  
Llywodraeth Cymru

16 Mehefin 2017

Annwyl Mick

### **COD ERLYN LLYWODRAETH CYMRU**

Yn ein cyfarfod ar 12 Mehefin, trafodwyd Cod Eryln Llywodraeth Cymru, yr ydych wedi'i gyhoeddi i ymgynghori arno'n ddiweddar.

Fel y gwyddoch, rydym newydd adrodd i'r Cynulliad ynghylch rhai o'r canllawiau statudol mewn perthynas â'r amgylchedd hanesyddol a chod ymarfer mewn perthynas â rheoli rhywogaethau.

Mynegwyd pryder ynghylch y ffaith nad yw'r ddau ddarn o is-ddeddfwriaeth wedi'u drafftio mewn ffordd fwy eglur i helpu cyrff cyhoeddus i ddeall yr hyn y gallant ei wneud, yr hyn y dylent ei wneud, a chanlyniadau peidio â gwneud unrhyw un o'r pethau hynny.

Wrth edrych ar y cod erlyn, rydym wedi nodi bod llawer o enghreifftiau o "rhaid" a "dylai", a bod rhai enghreifftiau o "dylai" yn peri syndod. Er enghraifft, mae'r cod yn nodi "*Dylai erlynwyr ystyried a yw'r holl dystiolaeth yn debygol o fod yn dderbyniol ai peidio*". Oni ddylai hyn fod yn "rhaid" yn hytrach na "dylai"?

Hefyd, ni cheir esboniad o ystyr "rhaid" ac ystyr "dylai", ac ni cheir esboniad o ganlyniadau peidio â gwneud y pethau y mae'n "rhaid" eu gwneud a'r pethau y "dylai" gael eu gwneud.



Rydym felly'n gobeithio y caiff y cod ei adolygu i ateb ein pryderon cyn i ni wneud gwaith craffu ffurfiol ar y darn hwn o is-ddeddfwriaeth o dan Reol Sefydlog.

Yn gywir

*Huw Irranca-Davies*

**Huw Irranca-Davies**

Cadeirydd

Croesewir gohebiaeth yn Gymraeg neu Saesneg.  
We welcome correspondence in Welsh or English.





## **INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT**

### **Background to this Agreement**

1. The Smith Commission agreement considered the issue of inter-governmental relations in some detail. Amongst the recommendations of the Commission was that inter-governmental arrangements to support the devolution of further powers be “underpinned by much stronger and more transparent parliamentary scrutiny”.
2. The Commission stated that this improved transparency would include the laying of reports regarding implementation and operation of any revised Memorandum of Understanding between governments and the pro-active reporting to parliaments regarding inter-administration bilateral meetings established to implement the proposals for further devolution. Examples of multilateral and bilateral meetings cited by the Commission were the Joint Ministerial Committee and the Joint Exchequer Committee.
3. The Devolution (Further Powers) Committee considered the issue of inter-governmental relations in its report, *‘Changing Relationships: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Intergovernmental Relations’*. In particular the Committee made the following recommendation:

“The Committee considers that a new Written Agreement on Parliamentary Oversight of IGR between the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament with regard to the provision of information and how the views of the Scottish Parliament will be incorporated with regard to IGR agreements is an appropriate approach to adopt in order to aid transparency in this area.

The Committee considers that information provided by governments must enable parliamentary scrutiny of formal, inter-ministerial meetings before and after such meetings. Such information, must include, as a minimum, a ‘forward look’ calendar of IGR meetings and the agendas for these meetings. Subsequently, detailed minutes of meetings held and the text of any agreements reached must also be made available to legislatures in a timely manner”.

4. In response to the Committee's report, the Deputy First Minister wrote to the Committee Convener, Bruce Crawford MSP, confirming that the Scottish Government was supportive in principle with the Committee's recommendation with regard to a written agreement between the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government. The Deputy First Minister noted that the approach taken would be "subject to the need to both respect the views of other Governments involved and maintain confidentiality around discussions as and when appropriate".

## **Purpose of the Agreement**

5. This Written Agreement represents the agreed position of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government on the information that the Scottish Government will, where appropriate (see paragraph 6 below), provide the Scottish Parliament with regard to its own participation in formal, ministerial-level inter-governmental meetings, concordats, agreements and memorandums of understanding.
6. In reaching this Agreement, the Scottish Government recognises the Scottish Parliament's primary purpose of scrutinising the activity of the Scottish Government within formal inter-governmental structures. The Scottish Parliament also recognises and respects the need for a shared, private space for inter-governmental discussion between the administrations within the United Kingdom, such as, in situations where negotiations are on-going.
7. This Agreement is in recognition of the increased complexity and 'shared' space between the Scottish and UK Governments that the powers proposed for devolution entail. It further recognises that the increased interdependence between devolved and reserved competences will be managed mainly in inter-governmental relations. This Agreement seeks to ensure that the principles of the Scottish Government's accountability to the Scottish Parliament and transparency with regard to these relationships are built into the revised inter-governmental mechanisms from the outset of this structure of devolution.
8. This Agreement establishes three principles which will govern the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government with regard to inter-governmental relations. These are:
  - Transparency
  - Accountability
  - Respect for the confidentiality of discussions between governments

## **Scope of this Agreement**

9. This Agreement applies to the participation of Scottish Ministers in formal, inter-governmental structures. This means, in practice, discussions and agreements of, or linked to, the Joint Ministerial Committee (in all its functioning formats); the Finance Ministers' Quadrilaterals; the Joint

Exchequer Committee; the Joint Ministerial Group on Welfare; and other standing or ad hoc multilateral and bilateral inter-ministerial forums of similar standing as may be established. This Agreement does not cover other engagement between the governments, although the Annual Report (referred to in paragraph 16) will comment upon the range and scale of such activity.

10. This Agreement is intended to support the Scottish Parliament's capacity to scrutinise Scottish Government activity and to hold Scottish Ministers to account in the intergovernmental arena only. The Agreement in no way places obligations on other administrations and legislatures involved with inter-governmental relations and the groups and agreements described here. In line with the principle of respect for the confidentiality of discussions between administrations, the Agreement recognises that the release of details of discussions directly involving intergovernmental partners is subject to their consent.
11. Subject to the above, the Scottish Government agrees to provide, to the relevant committee of the Scottish Parliament, as far as practicable, advance written notice at least one month prior to scheduled relevant meetings, or in the case of meetings with less than one month's notice, as soon as possible after meetings are scheduled. This will enable the relevant Committee to express a view on the topic and, if appropriate, to invite the Minister responsible to attend a Committee meeting in advance of the inter-governmental meeting. Advance written notice will include agenda items and a broad outline of key issues to be discussed, with recognition that agenda items, from time to time, may be marked as "private" in recognition of the need for confidentiality.
12. After each inter-governmental ministerial meeting within the scope of this Agreement, the Scottish Government will provide the relevant committee of the Scottish Parliament with a written summary of the issues discussed at the meeting as soon as practicable and, if possible, within two weeks. Such a summary will include any joint statement released after the meeting, information pertaining to who attended the meeting, when the meeting took place, and where appropriate, subject to the need to respect confidentiality, an indication of key issues and of the content of discussions and an outline of the positions advanced by the Scottish Government.
13. The Scottish Government also agrees to provide to the relevant committee of the Scottish Parliament the text of any multilateral or bilateral inter-governmental agreements, memorandums of understanding or other resolutions within the scope of this Agreement.
14. In line with the provisions of paragraph 9 above, in circumstances where the Scottish Government intends to establish new arrangements with the aim of reaching an intergovernmental agreement the Scottish Government will provide advance notice to the Scottish Parliament of its intention to do so. .
15. The Scottish Government also agrees to maintain a record of all relevant formal intergovernmental agreements, concordats, resolutions and



memorandums that the Scottish Government has entered into and to make these accessible on the Scottish Government's website.

## **Annual Report**

16. The Scottish Government will prepare an Annual Report on inter-governmental relations and submit this to the relevant Committee of the Scottish Parliament. This report will summarise the key outputs from activity that is subject to the provisions of this agreement, including any reports issued by relevant inter-governmental forums. It will also comment upon the range of broader inter-governmental relations work undertaken during the year, including dispute resolution. That report will also, provide as much information as is practicable and appropriate of issues expected to emerge in the year that follows.

## **Appearances before committees**

17. In line with the Parliament's overarching [Protocol](#) between Committees and the Scottish Government, Scottish Ministers will attend, as appropriate, meetings of the relevant committee of the Scottish Parliament when invited.
18. When issuing an invitation for a Minister to provide oral evidence the relevant clerk(s) should liaise with the Minister's private office in the first instance to determine a suitable date and time and should take into account the timing of Cabinet and other major Ministerial commitments already scheduled in the diary. When reasonable notice has been given, the Minister should give priority to attending the committee meeting.
19. Furthermore, the relevant committee(s) may invite Scottish Government officials alone (i.e. not accompanying a Minister) to attend a meeting for the purpose of giving oral evidence on any relevant matter which is within the official's area of expertise and for which the Scottish Government has general responsibility.

# DATGANIAD YSGRIFENEDIG GAN LYWODRAETH CYMRU

Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

**TEITL** BIL YR UNDEB EWROPEAIDD (YMADAEL)

**DYDDIAD** 13 Gorffennaf 2017

**GAN** Carwyn Jones AC, Prif Weinidog Cymru

Heddiw, mae Llywodraeth y DU wedi cyhoeddi Bil yr Undeb Ewropeaidd (Ymadael).

Mae safbwynt Llywodraeth Cymru wedi bod yn glir ers diwrnod canlyniad y refferendwm ar yr UE - mae'r DU yn gadael yr UE a byddwn yn gweithio gyda Llywodraeth y DU i sicrhau Brexit synhwyrol, sy'n diogelu swyddi a'n heconomi. Felly, byddem yn barod i gefnogi Bil sy'n rhoi eglurder a sicrwydd i fusnesau a'n cymunedau, ac sy'n parchu'r setliad datganoli.

Ond nid yw'r Bil hwn yn gwneud hyn. Yn wir, nid yw ychwaith yn bodloni nod datganedig y Prif Weinidog ei hun i gydweithio mewn modd adeiladol, er mwyn sicrhau Brexit llwyddiannus. Er mawr siom, mae ein hymdrechion i weithio gyda Llywodraeth y DU ar y materion hyn wedi cael eu hanwybyddu.

Er bod y Bil, o bosibl, yn ymddangos yn ymarfer cyfreithiol a thechnegol astrus, bydd y Ddeddf Seneddol derfynol y mae'r Bil yn arwain ati yn hollbwysig wrth siapio'r ffordd y mae'r Deyrnas Unedig yn gweithio - neu o bosibl ddim yn gweithio - ar ôl i ni adael yr UE.

Mae'r Bil yn gorff o destun cyfreithiol cymhleth, ac mae ymgynghoriad Llywodraeth y DU â'r Gweinyddiaethau Datganoledig ar ddatblygu'r cynigion deddfwriaethol hanfodol hyn wedi bod yn annigonol, ac yn gwbl groes i'r hyn a glywyd gan y Prif Weinidog ac aelodau eraill o Lywodraeth y DU yr wythnos hon, am eu hymrwymiad i wrando ar eraill, a dod i gonsensws â hwy am yr heriau a ddaw yn sgil ymadawiad y DU â'r UE. Cafodd ein swyddogion lai na phythefnos o rybudd am y cynigion ac, yn ymarferol, nid ydym wedi cael cyfle go iawn i awgrymu unrhyw newidiadau sylweddol a fyddai'n gwneud y Bil yn un mwy derbyniol.

Mae hyn er gwaetha'r ffaith ein bod wedi gweithio'n galed yn gyson i ymgysylltu â Llywodraeth y DU, mewn trafodaethau dwyochrog a thrwy'r Cyd-bwyllgor Gweinidogion, a'n bod wedi mynd ati'n rhagweithiol i gyflwyno cynigion polisi cadarnhaol am sut i sicrhau Brexit sy'n parchu canlyniad y refferendwm ac yn diogelu lles economaidd Cymru, a'r DU gyfan.

Yn ystod y trafodaethau am y posibilrwydd o gael 'Bil Diddymu Mawr', rydym wedi egluro ein bod yn deall, ac yn cefnogi'r syniad o gael Bil a fydd yn rhoi eglurder a sicrwydd i ddinasyddion a busnesau wrth i Brexit ddod i rym. Rydym hefyd yn derbyn y bydd angen gwneud rhai diwygiadau fel bod y gyfraith bresennol yn ymarferol o ran y cyd-destun newydd bod y DU y tu allan i'r UE. Rydym yn fodlon chwarae ein rhan yn hynny.

Mae ein papur *Brexit a Datganoli* yn cyflwyno dull gweithredu clir ac ymarferol sy'n parchu datganoli ac yn ateb y cwestiwn ynghylch sut i sicrhau tegwch ar draws y DU o ran polisïau, lle mae fframweithiau rheoleiddiol yr UE wedi darparu hyn hyd yma. Er ein bod wedi pwysu,

nid ydym eto wedi cael unrhyw ymateb gwirioneddol gan Lywodraeth y DU am y cynigion hyn.

Mae felly'n siom mawr bod Llywodraeth y DU wedi gwrthod gwrando, ac yn ymddangos yn benderfynol o bryfocio gwrthdaro cyfansoddiadol, nad oes ei angen o gwbl.

O safbwynt Llywodraeth Cymru, mae cyhoeddi'r Bil yn cynrychioli her sylweddol i'r setliad datganoli. Yn wir, yn ein barn ni, dyma'r ymosodiad mwyaf ar ddatganoli ers i'r Cynulliad Cenedlaethol gael ei sefydlu ym 1999.

Er gwaetha'r rhybuddion clir a niferus y byddai unrhyw ymgais gan San Steffan a Whitehall i gymryd y pwerau sydd gan yr UE ar hyn o bryd a'u cadw iddyn nhw eu hunain yn hollol annerbyniol, dyna'n union y mae Cymal 11 o Fil yr UE (Ymadael) yn ceisio ei wneud.

Byddai rhan hon y Bil yn diwygio'r ddeddfwriaeth ddatganoli a rhoi cyfyngiadau newydd - heb unrhyw derfynau neu gymwysterau - ar allu'r Cynulliad i ddeddfu yn effeithiol ar faterion lle rydym yn gweithredu ar hyn o bryd o fewn fframweithiau deddfwriaethol a ddatblygwyd gan yr UE, hyd yn oed ar ôl inni adael yr UE. Byddai cyfreithiau presennol yr UE yn cael eu rhewi, a dim ond Llywodraeth y DU, ymddengys, fyddai â'r hawl i'w dadrewi.

Yn ymarferol, byddai hyn yn rhoi cyfle i Lywodraeth y DU geisio cymeradwyaeth Seneddol i osod fframweithiau newydd i'r DU gyfan ar gyfer y polisïau hyn. Dyma ymgais i ad-ennill rheolaeth dros bolisïau datganoledig fel yr amgylchedd, amaethyddiaeth a physgodfeydd nid yn unig o Frwsel, ond o Gaerdydd, Caeredin a Belffast.

Rydym wedi cael ar ddeall bod Llywodraeth y DU yn dymuno trafod â ni, ac â'r Gweinyddiaethau Datganoledig eraill, i weld a oes modd inni gyflawni'r un canlyniadau drwy drafod a chytuno yn hytrach na deddfwriaeth unochrog. Fodd bynnag, nid oes dim yn nhestun y Bil na'r dogfennau ategol sy'n adlewyrchu hyn.

Mae'r Bil hefyd yn cynnig y dylai'r pwerau hynny, a elwir yn bwerau Henri'r VIII, a roddir i Weinidogion Cymru - yn wahanol i'r rheini a arferir gan Weinidogion y DU - gael eu cyfyngu mewn ffyrdd hynod o anymarferol.

Byddai'r pŵer i ddiwygio cyfraith yr UE sy'n berthnasol yn uniongyrchol - rheoliadau ac ati, sy'n cyfrif am y rhan fwyaf o fframwaith deddfwriaethol yr UE ar gyfer amaethyddiaeth, er enghraifft - yn cael ei gadw gan Lywodraeth y DU yn unig.

A gan y byddai Gweinidogion y DU yn cadw eu pwerau eu hunain - ynghyd â rhai Gweinidogion Cymru - i ddiwygio unrhyw ddeddfwriaeth mewn maes lle y mae cymhwysedd wedi ei ddatganoli, ymddengys y byddai Gweinidogion y DU hyd yn oed yn gallu diwygio deddfwriaeth sy'n dod o fewn cymhwysedd y Cynulliad Cenedlaethol heb fod yn atebol i'r Cynulliad i egluro beth maent yn ei wneud a pham.

Os na chaiff y Bil ei ddiwygio, ni fydd Llywodraeth Cymru yn argymhell i'r Cynulliad Cenedlaethol roi cydsyniad deddfwriaethol iddo. Byddwn hefyd yn parhau i edrych ar sut y gallwn ddefnyddio ein pwerau deddfwriaethol presennol i helpu i amddiffyn ein setliad datganoli.

Wrth wneud hynny, byddwn yn gweithio'n agos gyda gweinyddiaethau datganoledig eraill; yn wir, mae Prif Weinidog yr Alban a minnau wedi cyhoeddi datganiad ar y cyd heddiw, lle rydym yn pwysleisio na allwn gefnogi'r Bil fel y mae ar hyn o bryd.

Nid atal, tanseilio na chymhlethu Brexit yw'r nod - mae'n ymwneud â gwrthsefyll ymgais i ail-ganoli pŵer yn ôl i San Steffan a Whitehall, i droi'r cloc yn ôl i adeg cyn datganoli pan y gallai Llywodraeth Llundain wrthio polisïau amhriodol ar Gymru a'r Alban heb gydsyniad

pleidleiswyr y ddwy wlad hynny. Nid oes gan y Lywodraeth Doriäidd fandad ar gyfer hyn, lleiaf oll gan bleidleiswyr yng Nghymru.

Gan ystyried pwysigrwydd y mater, rwy'n bwriadu dod a hyn i'r Cynulliad cyn gynted â phosibl.

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/18005.pdf> (Seasneg yn unig)

# Joint statement from First Ministers of Wales and Scotland in reaction to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill

**Responding to the introduction of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon and First Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones have today issued a joint statement.**

**Thursday 13 July 2017**

This week began with the Prime Minister calling for a constructive and collaborative approach from those outside Whitehall to help get Brexit right. Today's publication of The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is the first test as to whether the UK government is serious about such an approach. It is a test it has failed utterly.

"We have repeatedly tried to engage with the UK government on these matters, and have put forward constructive proposals about how we can deliver an outcome which will protect the interests of all the nations in the UK, safeguard our economies and respect devolution.

"Regrettably, the bill does not do this. Instead, it is a naked power-grab, an attack on the founding principles of devolution and could destabilise our economies.

"Our 2 governments – and the UK government – agree we need a functioning set of laws across the UK after withdrawal from the EU. We also recognise that common frameworks to replace EU laws across the UK may be needed in some areas. But the way to achieve these aims is through negotiation and agreement, not imposition. It must be done in a way which respects the hard-won devolution settlements.

"The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill does not return powers from the EU to the devolved administrations, as promised. It returns them solely to the UK government

and Parliament, and imposes new restrictions on the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales.

“On that basis, the Scottish and Welsh Governments cannot recommend that legislative consent is given to the bill as it currently stands.

“The bill lifts from the UK government and Parliament the requirement to comply with EU law, but does the opposite for the devolved legislatures: it imposes a new set of strict restrictions. These new restrictions make no sense in the context of the UK leaving the EU.

“We have explained these points to the UK government and have set out what we consider to be a constructive way forward in the spirit of co-operation, based on the involvement of, and respect for, devolved institutions.

“Unfortunately, the conversation has been entirely one-sided. We remain open to these discussions, and look forward to coming to an agreed solution between the governments of these islands.”

# Eitem 4.8

## **EUROPEAN UNION (WITHDRAWAL) BILL**

### **Memorandum concerning the Delegated Powers in the Bill for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee**

#### **CONTENTS**

- 1. SHORT SUMMARY OF POWERS**
- 2. DELEGATED POWERS MEMORANDUM**
  - a. INTRODUCTION**
  - b. CONTEXT AND PURPOSE**
  - c. ANALYSIS OF DELEGATED POWERS BY CLAUSE**

# 1. SHORT SUMMARY OF POWERS

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill will repeal the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) on the day we leave the EU. It will convert EU law as it applies in the UK into domestic law so that wherever practical and sensible, the same laws and rules will apply after we leave the EU as they did before.

POWER	JUSTIFICATION	SCRUTINY
Clause 7/Schedule 2 Part 1 - Powers to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law	Retained EU law will contain thousands of failures and deficiencies. This power enables UK ministers and the devolved authorities to make corrections in time for exit to ensure a functioning statute book.	Affirmative Procedure must be used for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishing a new public authority</li> <li>- Transferring functions to a newly created public authority</li> <li>- Transferring EU legislative functions to a public authority in the UK</li> <li>- Provision relating to fees</li> <li>- Creating or widening the scope of a criminal offence</li> <li>- Creating or amending a power to legislate</li> </ul> Otherwise negative procedure can be used.
Clause 8/Schedule 2 Part 2 - Powers to comply with international obligations	The UK's withdrawal from the EU could lead to unintended breaches of our international obligations. This power allows regulations to be made to prevent or remedy such breaches.	Affirmative Procedure must be used for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishing a new public authority</li> <li>- Transferring functions to a newly created public authority</li> <li>- Transferring EU legislative functions to a public authority in the UK</li> <li>- Provision relating to fees or charges</li> </ul>



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creating or widening the scope of a criminal offence</li> <li>- Creating or amending a power to legislate</li> </ul> <p>Otherwise negative procedure can be used.</p>
Clause 9/Schedule 2 Part 3 - Powers to implement the withdrawal agreement	This power allows for the implementation of a withdrawal agreement reached with the EU.	<p>Affirmative Procedure must be used for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishing a new public authority</li> <li>- Transferring functions to a newly created public authority</li> <li>- Transferring EU legislative functions to a public authority in the UK</li> <li>- Provision relating to fees</li> <li>- Creating or widening the scope of a criminal offence</li> <li>- Creating or amending a power to legislate</li> <li>- Amendments to the Bill itself.</li> </ul> <p>Otherwise negative procedure can be used</p>
Clause 11/Schedule 3 - Power to make exceptions to limit on devolved competence to modify retained EU law	This power allows for exceptions to be introduced to the updated limit on devolved legislative or executive competence that is created by the Bill.	<p>Order in Council</p> <p>Requires approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature</p>
Clause 14 - Power to specify 'exit day'	This power enables a Minister of the Crown to specify when exit day is for the purposes of the Bill.	No procedure
Clause 17(1) - Power to make consequential provision	This power enables a Minister of the Crown to make consequential provision in consequence of this Bill.	Negative procedure

Clause 17(5) - Power to make transitional, transitory or saving provision	This is a standard power for a Minister of the Crown to make transitional, transitory or saving provision in connection with the coming into force provisions of the Bill or the appointment of exit day.	Negative, affirmative or no procedure
Clause 19 - Power to make commencement provisions	This is a standard power for a Minister of the Crown to bring provisions of the Bill into force by commencement regulations	No procedure
Schedule 1 - Power to provide for a right of challenge to the validity of retained EU law	Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to declare an EU measure invalid. This power would enable a Minister of the Crown to provide in domestic law for a right of challenge to the validity of retained EU law.	Affirmative procedure
Schedule 4 Part 1 - Powers to provide for fees and charges in connection with new functions	The Bill enables functions to be given to Government, UK bodies or devolved bodies, for example functions previously performed by the EU. This power enables, where appropriate, the costs of providing government services to be charged to those individuals or industries who received them, rather than the general taxpayer.	Affirmative procedure for creation of fees or charges and subdelegation, otherwise negative procedure
Schedule 4 Part 1 - Power to disapply consent requirements or prescribe additional functions in relation to which the devolved authorities can exercise the fees and charges power	This power enables a Minister of the Crown to prescribe additional circumstances where devolved authorities can exercise the power in Schedule 4 paragraph 1, and to disapply consent requirements	Negative procedure

Schedule 4 Part 2 - Power to modify pre-exit fees and charges	This power enables fees and charges made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 and section 56 of the Finance Act 1973 to be modified or removed, despite the repeal of the 1972 Act, and the amendment of section 56 of the 1973 Act, by the Bill.	Negative procedure
Schedule 5 - Power to make exceptions from duty to publish retained EU law	This power enables a minister to give a direction to the Queen's Printer that an instrument need not be published	None (power to give direction)
Schedule 5 - Power to make provision about judicial notice and admissibility	This power enables a Minister of the Crown to make provision as to judicial notice and evidential rules on EU law, the EEA agreement, and retained EU law.	Affirmative procedure

## **2. DELEGATED POWERS MEMORANDUM**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

1. This memorandum has been prepared for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to assist with its scrutiny of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (“the Bill”). This memorandum identifies the provisions of the Bill that confer powers to make delegated legislation. It explains in each case why the power has been taken and explains the nature of, and the reason for, the procedure selected. This memorandum reflects the Bill as introduced to the House of Commons on 13<sup>th</sup> July 2017.

### **B. CONTEXT AND PURPOSE**

2. The Government’s approach is to provide as much certainty as possible as we move through the process of exiting the European Union (EU). The Bill is an essential part of this and will ensure that, wherever possible, the same rules and laws apply on the day after we leave the EU as before. This will enable the UK to leave the EU in a smooth and orderly way, minimising uncertainty for business, workers and consumers. The Bill will:

- Repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and return power to UK institutions.
- Convert the body of existing EU law as it stands at the moment of exit into domestic law, before we leave the EU, subject to some exceptions. This allows businesses to continue operating knowing the rules have not changed significantly overnight. After this it will be up to Parliament and, where a matter is within their competence, the devolved legislatures to amend, repeal or improve any piece of what will then be UK law at the appropriate time once we have left the EU.
- Give powers that enable our law to continue to function sensibly outside the EU and to enable the withdrawal agreement to be implemented as appropriate.

3. In the analysis of each power it is specified whether it is conferred on the devolved authorities. Where the Bill confers powers on the devolved authorities, such as the power to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law, their use is limited to domestic legislation within areas of devolved competence. Limited specific consent requirements apply to the exercise of individual powers by the devolved authorities in certain circumstances.

### **Examples in this Memorandum**

4. This memorandum includes as many examples as possible of how the powers might be used. However, one of the reasons for taking delegated powers is that this Bill will be before Parliament at the same time as negotiations with the European Union are taking place. As a result the solutions might change, and we also need to protect the UK's negotiating position, so we cannot make public all the details of the secondary legislation that we expect might be made under these powers. There are also other reasons why, in particular policy areas, decisions might not yet have been taken as to how the powers in this Bill will be exercised. This inability to set out in advance how the powers will be used is part of the reason why we have chosen to constrain the powers in a number of ways, to reassure Parliament that these powers will only be used for the purpose for which they were designed.

5. Therefore any examples used in this paper are illustrative of the way the powers could be used and do not represent actual plans at this stage. In no way should the examples be taken to signify areas in which the Government does or does not expect to reach an agreement with the EU. The United Kingdom wants to agree with the EU a deep and special partnership. However, we cannot know the precise shape of that partnership in advance and so in areas potentially affected by the negotiations it is not possible to provide definite examples of the use of the various delegated powers at this stage. In some cases, it is not possible to provide specific examples at all.

## C. ANALYSIS OF DELEGATED POWERS BY CLAUSE

### Clause 7 and Schedule 2, Part 1: Power to deal with deficiencies arising from withdrawal

This is the correcting power that enables UK ministers or devolved authorities to make corrections to law, with Parliament's consent, to make it work appropriately after the UK has left the EU.

***Power conferred on:***

- (a) a Minister of the Crown<sup>1</sup>,*
- (b) a devolved authority, or*
- (c) a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with one or more devolved authorities*

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative or affirmative

### **Context and purpose**

6. The core of the Bill is the power to make sure the UK's statute book functions on exit when the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) has been repealed. The Bill replaces the framework of the ECA with a new framework - of "retained EU law" - which provides a basis from which the UK Parliament and the Devolved Legislatures can make their own laws.

7. The "retained EU law" is comprised of:

- Converted legislation (which is direct EU legislation (EU regulations, EU decisions, EU tertiary legislation) and direct EU legislation as it applies with adaptations to the EEA);
- Preserved legislation (which includes regulations made under section 2(2) or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to the ECA, other primary and secondary legislation with the same purpose as regulations under section 2(2) ECA,

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of the Bill, Minister of the Crown includes the Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

other domestic legislation relating to those things or to converted legislation, and legislation which otherwise relates to the EU or EEA);

- Any other rights which are recognised and available in domestic law through section 2(1) ECA (for example, directly effective rights contained in the EU treaties); and
- Historic CJEU case law (that will be given the same binding or precedent status in our courts as decisions of our own Supreme Court).

8. The conversion of directly applicable EU law and the savings provided by the Bill will not be sufficient to ensure a functioning statute book. On our withdrawal from the EU, there will be some areas of law which will not be operable or which will not operate properly; these deficiencies will arise because we are no longer a member of the EU. Failures and deficiencies may take several forms as set out below.

9. The correcting power will, therefore, allow a Minister of the Crown or a devolved authority to make regulations to prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies that would otherwise arise as a result of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The power also allows regulations to be made where a deficiency would arise from withdrawal taken together with a provision, or provisions, of the Bill. This corrective action will be able to be taken in advance of exit day, so that from the day we leave the EU our statute book, including the legislation converted and preserved by this Bill, functions properly.

### **Devolution**

10. Similar issues will also exist in legislation that is the responsibility of the devolved authorities. Therefore an equivalent power will also be exercisable by the devolved authorities to allow them to deal with deficiencies in domestic legislation within devolved competence. The examples given below are illustrative and **should not be read as actual plans as to whether the power in any particular case would be exercised by a UK Minister of the Crown or a devolved authority.**

11. The devolved authorities will only be able to make corrections within their areas of devolved competence. Devolved competence is defined in paragraphs 9 to 12 of Schedule 2 to the Bill. The UK Government will not normally use the power to amend domestic legislation in areas of devolved competence without the agreement of the relevant devolved authority.

### **Justification for taking the power**

12. The Government understands that there will be concerns on the breadth of the correcting power and the level of Parliamentary scrutiny. There are three principal reasons why this approach has been chosen:

**i. Time:** The two year timetable for exit is provided for in Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union. Therefore, the UK needs to be in a position to control its own laws from March 2019, which is why the UK Government and devolved administrations need to take a power so they can act quickly and flexibly to provide a functioning statute book. The complexity of identifying and making appropriate amendments to the converted and preserved body of law should not be underestimated. There is over 40 years of EU law to consider and amend to ensure that our statute book functions properly on our exit from the EU. According to EUR-Lex, the EU's legal database, there are currently over 12,000 EU regulations and over 6,000 EU directives in force across the EU.<sup>2</sup> We are not yet in a position to set out in primary legislation how each failure and deficiency should be addressed, nor would it be practical to do so. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee stated, shortly after it was established:

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<sup>2</sup> EUR-Lex search run on 26 May 2017, [http://eurlex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1490700962298&VV=true&DB\\_TYPE\\_OF\\_ACT=allRegulation&DTC=false&DTS\\_DOM=EU\\_LAW&typeOfActStatus=ALL\\_REGULATION&type=advanced&lang=en&SUBDOM\\_INIT=LEGISLATION&DTS\\_SUBDOM=LEGISLATION](http://eurlex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1490700962298&VV=true&DB_TYPE_OF_ACT=allRegulation&DTC=false&DTS_DOM=EU_LAW&typeOfActStatus=ALL_REGULATION&type=advanced&lang=en&SUBDOM_INIT=LEGISLATION&DTS_SUBDOM=LEGISLATION) and [http://eurlex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1495788221421&DB\\_TYPE\\_OF\\_ACT=directive&CASE\\_LAW\\_SUMMARY=false&DTS\\_DOM=ALL&excConsLeg=true&typeOfActStatus=DIRECTIVE&type=advanced&SUBDOM\\_INIT=ALL\\_ALL&DTS\\_SUBDOM=ALL\\_ALL&FM\\_CODED=DIR](http://eurlex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1495788221421&DB_TYPE_OF_ACT=directive&CASE_LAW_SUMMARY=false&DTS_DOM=ALL&excConsLeg=true&typeOfActStatus=DIRECTIVE&type=advanced&SUBDOM_INIT=ALL_ALL&DTS_SUBDOM=ALL_ALL&FM_CODED=DIR)



*“The need to change detailed provisions from time to time would place impossible burdens on Parliament if the changes always required the introduction of new legislation.”<sup>3</sup>*

The unique circumstances of withdrawing from the EU make this problem even more acute. The Government has already identified a number of other key Bills that will be needed to ensure a smooth and orderly exit and these are in addition to other planned Bills which will deliver the Government’s wider agenda.

**ii. Practicality:** The power will be exercised by UK ministers and the devolved authorities, enabling them to make the necessary corrections to the statute book required to make the law function effectively in their own field of expertise and competence. Making all corrections on the face of the Bill, at this stage, would not be practical.

**iii. Flexibility:** Many of the potential deficiencies or failures in law arise in areas in which the UK is considering pursuing a negotiated outcome with the EU. The UK must be ready to respond to all eventualities as we negotiate with the EU. Whatever the outcome, the UK Government and devolved authorities, with the appropriate scrutiny by Parliament and the devolved legislatures, must be able to deliver a functioning statute book for day one post-exit.

13. In its report on the Bill and delegated powers<sup>4</sup>, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution noted the complexities of the issues which the Government would need to address and concluded that in the circumstances it would be unrealistic to limit tightly the power needed to adapt retained EU law. The Select Committee said that -

*“it will be difficult tightly to define, in advance, the limits of the delegated powers granted under the Bill without potentially hobbling the Government’s ability to adapt EU law to fit the UK’s circumstances following Brexit. We do not think it is realistic to assume that the*

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<sup>3</sup> 1st Report, Session 1992-93 (HL. Paper 57), paragraph 1.

<sup>4</sup> [The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers](#), 9th Report of Session 2016-17

*Government will have worked out, in advance of the Bill being considered by Parliament, what amendments will be needed to the corpus of EU law. That being the case, it is unrealistic to assume that Parliament will be able tightly to limit the delegated powers granted under the Bill—because it will not be clear what, exactly, they will be required to do”<sup>5</sup>.*

14. It is essential that the power is broad enough to capture all of the necessary corrections. If the full range of deficiencies is not addressed there will be consequences for individuals, businesses, and other organisations. The work across government has identified the main failures and deficiencies that would need correcting, subject to the negotiations, and these are outlined below.

**i. Removing redundant provisions:**

15. Without corrections to the law, on exiting the EU the UK would still have certain obligations to the EU or be bound by EU decisions when it is no longer a member - these are redundant provisions. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority and UK courts would continue to be required to decide UK antitrust cases in line with the decisions of the European Courts on competition matters on corresponding questions, and to have regard to relevant decisions or statements by the European Commission as well.

16. Depending on the negotiations, this might no longer be appropriate, and therefore people in the UK would expect the Competition and Markets Authority and UK courts to be able to make independent decisions on competition issues in the UK. The power would be used to amend primary and secondary legislation to remove the EU elements of competition law but to leave domestic UK competition regime intact. This would ensure the continued effective operation of the existing UK competition regime.

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<sup>5</sup> [The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers](#), 9th Report of Session 2016-17, page 16

17. Legislation providing for elections to the European Parliament (the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 and the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003) will be repealed on the face of the Bill, because this legislation is intrinsically related to membership of the EU and its repeal is an inevitable outcome of exiting the EU. Other provisions relating to references to European Parliamentary elections will be similarly redundant and are expected to be removed using the correcting power where they are contained in the body of retained EU law, or the power to make consequential provision. There will be other similar, limited cases where secondary legislation under the correcting power may need to be able to (at least at face value) remove rights from UK citizens. In practice, this is removing redundant provisions that no longer makes sense when the UK is no longer part of the European Union; these SIs will simply be reflecting the outcome in international law.

## **ii. Transferring Functions**

18. Many UK businesses and citizens depend on services, currently provided at an EU level, that enable markets to function and provide protection for individuals. It is essential that we are able to repatriate functions from the EU to the UK, including the devolved authorities, if essential services are to continue.

19. For example, Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 sets up the European Air Safety Authority (EASA). If the UK ceases to be a member of EASA, the UK's Civil Aviation Authority would need to exercise many of the functions of EASA for the UK to ensure proper air safety. Without this correction, the Civil Aviation Authority would not have sufficient legal authority to regulate aviation safety. The power will enable such changes. A statutory instrument would amend Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 to remove redundant text and to amend references.

20. In certain scenarios, a UK body may need to start evaluating and authorising chemicals in the UK taking over functions currently performed at a EU level. The European Chemicals Agency currently conducts evaluation and authorisation of chemicals under the REACH regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006). This

function may need to be transferred so that consumers can continue to have confidence in the safety of certain chemicals and their proper regulation and international markets have sufficient confidence in the UK's products so that UK businesses can continue exporting. In the event of no deal in this area, a UK government body would take on the functions of assessing chemical substances under the REACH regulation. Some sample drafting is at **Annex A**.

21. Some functions are essential if the UK is to maintain its international relationships. Without a robust and recognised data collection and reporting method the UK may be in breach of international agreements and its produce may not be acceptable in the EU and other markets having a major impact on the industry.

22. For example, the EU Common Fisheries Policy requires the UK to carry out research, data collection and reporting in order to provide evidence to the EU and international bodies - this meets a wider international obligation on reporting. The UK's future position within the data collection framework will be subject to negotiations but should the UK not continue to be part of the EU framework we would need to transfer these functions to appropriate domestic bodies. It is essential that data collection, research and reporting can be carried out because, as a coastal state with a significant level of waters under its control, the UK must be able to evidence that fishing in its waters meets international obligations. Without a robust and recognised data collection and reporting method the UK may be in breach of international agreements and its produce may not be acceptable in the EU and other markets having a major impact on the industry.

23. Without a correction to the law, the UK would not have the powers to control the production and use of Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases (F Gases). If we do not comply with the United Nations Montreal Protocol, UK businesses would be excluded from global trade in these products. EU Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases (F-Gases) Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 requires a staged phase-down of F-Gases. In doing so it also implements a large part of an international commitment the UK (and EU) recently agreed to under the United Nations Montreal Protocol. The Regulation set up a system to phase down F-Gases across the EU by

controlling use and sales of F-gases in the EU, including by granting quota to companies to allow them to place F-gases on the EU market. In the event of no agreement in this area, these quota provisions would be inoperable in the UK on exit. A correction would be required to create an operable UK mechanism to replace the EU quota system.

### **iii. Removing reciprocal or other arrangements**

24. A key element of EU law is reciprocal arrangements between States and with the Commission.

25. The Bill preserves and converts law which on its face provides for reciprocal arrangements but it cannot require anything on the part of EU member states. In any areas where it is agreed with the EU that reciprocal provision should continue, then the law can remain in place as it is (unless the relevant law is deficient for some other reason). However, where there is no agreement in an area or the agreement is to no longer maintain reciprocal arrangements, then the effect of the Bill on its face could be to provide for domestic law to continue to offer benefits to EU member states and their citizens which would not be reciprocally available to the UK and its citizens in those member states. Dependent on what is appropriate and in the national interest in the particular context, the power can be used to modify, limit or remove such arrangements and resolve the imbalance.

26. Reciprocal arrangements cover a wide range of issues. As a member of the EU, the UK is obligated to provide certain benefits to citizens of other EU member states, and those member states are obligated to provide corresponding benefits to UK citizens. For example if the UK has sought but not secured reciprocal rights for UK citizens, the power can also be used to remove rights from EU citizens in the UK. These rights are based on the UK's membership of the EU; without that membership, or an alternative deal, they become deficient by incurring a disadvantage on the UK.

27. There are also reciprocal arrangements for other areas such as unlawful exports. For example, the UK has a reciprocal arrangement with other EU member states on the restitution of stolen cultural property. Any EU country can require, in the member state where the object is being held, court orders, including search and entry powers, to recover objects unlawfully exported to other countries. In the event that there was no provision in an agreement with the EU to retain the current arrangements, EU member states would still be able to require court orders to recover objects unlawfully exported to the UK, but the UK would lack the equivalent right in the EU. It would also mean that post-exit, owners whose objects are recovered by an EU state in this way would not receive compensation from that state, even if they performed appropriate due diligence. The power would allow the UK to remove the benefits offered to EU states and nationals in the absence of reciprocal benefits for UK nationals. Some sample drafting for this example is included at **Annex A**.

28. Reciprocal arrangements also exist with countries outside the EU under some of the EU Treaties. The analysis above applies equally to these agreements: there is the potential for deficiencies to arise in these agreements and for the correcting power to be used to prevent imbalances in domestic law.

29. Where a devolved authority uses the power to unwind a reciprocal arrangement this will require the consent of a Minister of the Crown.

#### **iv. Amending inappropriate references:**

30. This is the largest category of the changes required, based on our current assessment which we continue to refine: early estimates suggest up to half the corrections that might be required fall into this category. Incorrect references can make the law inoperable.

31. The impact of not making such changes would include inadvertently removing environmental protections. The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 require an environmental impact assessment of

certain applications for planning permission. They refer to “other EEA States” in a number of places, mainly in the context of development likely to have significant transboundary environmental effects. A correction amending the references to “other EEA States” to “EEA States”, would make it clear that the requirement on transboundary consultation continues to function on exit as it does now. This would remove uncertainty and help ensure that an important piece of environmental protection law continues to operate effectively.

#### **v. Other changes**

32. A statutory instrument made under this power by a Minister of the Crown can sub-delegate the power where appropriate: for example, if a regulator needed to make a substantial number of technical corrections to standards. The Government is clear that it would only take this approach where existing constitutional arrangements mean that it is more appropriate for the power to be exercised independent of political control. Such an instrument will have to be debated and approved by Parliament (affirmative procedure).

33. This is not an exhaustive list: there might be other types of corrections needed that do not fit into any of the categories set out above. The Government appreciates that the power is wide, but this reflects the wide-ranging and diverse number of areas in which failures and deficiencies will arise.

34. The purpose of the power is carefully described. It is limited to addressing failures of EU law to operate effectively or any other deficiencies which arise from withdrawal; it avoids an attempt at defining ‘necessary’ changes. There are some changes that might not strictly be necessary for the law to remain functional but will resolve clear deficiencies. Depending on the nature of any agreement with the EU, and other factors, the UK might wish to retain some reciprocal arrangements and not others; it might choose to continue sharing some functions with EU institutions and repatriate others. This power, combined with the power to implement the withdrawal agreement, allows flexibility based on the outcome of the negotiations on which Parliament will have a vote.

## **Amending Primary Legislation**

35. The power needs to be broad enough to allow for corrections to be made to both primary and secondary legislation and this means that the power must be a ‘Henry VIII’ power. In its report on the Bill and delegated powers, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution noted that -

*“the distinction between Henry VIII and other delegated powers is not in this exceptional context a reliable guide to the constitutional significance of such powers, and should not be taken by Parliament to be such”.<sup>6</sup>*

36. The Government agrees. A large number of fairly straightforward changes will be needed to primary legislation in readiness for exit day. For example, it may be desirable to make simple and non-substantive amendments to references in the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, as without changes they will not make sense after the UK ceases to be an EU member State. There are references to “*in another member state*” in section 21(1); “*of the other member state*” in section 21(3)(b); and “*by another member State*” – Schedule 3, paragraph 7(c).”

## **Limiting the Power**

37. The unique circumstances of this Bill necessitate a broad power, but it must be limited in purpose to achieving a smooth and orderly exit. Proper scrutiny of the use of the power is, as ever, essential. The Government agrees with the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that “*Ministers must not be handed virtually untrammelled power*”. Therefore the power has a number of limitations on it, recognising, as also the Committee does, that powers cannot be too tightly limited.

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<sup>6</sup> Page 16



**i. It is not a power to keep pace with EU law**

38. The UK leaving the EU is a one-off legislative process. Therefore, the power is designed to correct, in a finite period, a finite number of deficiencies. Government cannot use clause 7 as a substitute for section 2(2) of the ECA. Subsection (3) makes it clear that law cannot be considered deficient simply because it is no longer in line with developments in EU law. This means that divergence in the law post-exit is not in itself sufficient to trigger the power in clause 7.

39. If, however, an EU institution's rule-making powers have been transferred, under Clause 7, to a UK institution, there is nothing to prevent that UK institution from choosing to make regulations that correspond to future EU legislation if that is in the UK's interest. Any statutory instrument granting a public authority a new function will need to ensure there is proper oversight and scrutiny built into the exercise of that function.

**ii. The power cannot be used to impose taxes, amend the Human Rights Act, amend parts of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, create some criminal offences, make retrospective provision or for the purpose of implementing the withdrawal agreement.**

40. Subsection (6) contains restrictions on the use of the power to ensure that it cannot be used to make certain changes. The circumstances of the Bill mean the power is necessarily broad, but these restrictions will ensure it cannot be exercised beyond its purpose to correct law that would fail to operate effectively or be otherwise deficient on exit. It is appropriate to constrain government and the devolved authorities so that the power cannot be exercised in certain ways. The restriction on amending parts of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 is because that Act is the main statutory manifestation of the Belfast Agreement and it would not, therefore, generally be appropriate for a power with this breadth of scope to be capable of amending that Act.

41. Any corrections to the law that could not be made because of these restrictions would therefore need to be made by primary legislation, unless Parliament has delegated powers that allow such provisions in existing Acts.

42. There is a restriction on creating criminal offences: the power cannot be used to create offences punishable by sentences of more than two years. However it could be necessary to create or modify the scope of some criminal offences. For example, if it is an offence currently to fail to notify an EU institution of something and the UK no longer has a relationship with that institution, this would be a deficiency. It might be appropriate instead for the offence to be changed to a failure to notify the equivalent UK public authority that now exercises the same functions.

### **iii. The power can only be exercised for a limited time (sunset provision)**

43. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution said:

*“The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ will be an exceptional piece of legislation, necessitated by the extraordinary circumstances of Brexit: while the Government may make a case for a wide array of discretionary powers, this should in no way be taken as a precedent when considering the appropriate bounds of delegated powers in future.”<sup>7</sup>*

44. In recognising its exceptional nature, the Committee went on to recognise that a sunset provision might be one way to restrict the power. The correcting power is therefore curtailed by a sunset provision in subsection (7). Although the power is wide, it is time limited and cannot be used more than two years after we leave the EU. Government is seeking a time-limited power to deal with a unique set of circumstances: it is designed to allow corrections to the statute book so that it functions effectively and appropriately; it is not designed to provide government with long-term flexibility, or to set a precedent. The sunset provision reflects this.

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<sup>7</sup> Page 29

## **Scrutiny**

45. The proposed scrutiny procedures for all the powers are set out in Schedule 7, Parts 1 and 2. For clarity, this memorandum explains the scrutiny procedures as they apply to each power alongside the explanation of the power.

46. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee observed that *“getting the balance right will be crucial”* between achieving the substantial legislative task in the time available whilst ensuring *‘appropriate provision is made for full and effective scrutiny of the relevant secondary legislation.’*<sup>8</sup> The Government wants to ensure there is proper scrutiny of the use of the powers, proportionate to public interest and the task at hand. Affirmative and negative procedures will apply to regulations laid in the UK Parliament when the power is exercised by the UK Government and to regulations laid in the devolved legislatures when the power is exercised by the devolved authorities.

47. For those areas that are principally mechanistic, such as amending references, the negative procedure (or the equivalent in the devolved legislatures) can be used. We have taken the same approach to changes to either primary or secondary legislation: some changes to primary can be mechanistic and minor. Adopting the affirmative procedure for small corrections to primary legislation would produce impractical results. Instead, the requirement for affirmative procedures is based on the type of correction rather than where the correction is being made. Schedule 7 sets out the criteria that will trigger the use of the affirmative procedures for statutory instruments made under the Bill. For Clause 7, these are:

- a. **Establishing a new public authority.** This will involve setting up new systems and spending public money both for set-up and ongoing expenses; Parliament or the relevant devolved legislature should scrutinise the creation of the body and debate the Government’s or the relevant devolved authority’s choices to understand why an existing body could not do the job.

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<sup>8</sup> Delegated Powers and Reform Committee, Second Submission to the House of Commons Procedure Committee  
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/lddelreg/164/16404.htm>

- b. **Transferring functions to newly created public authorities.** As follows the point above, Parliament or the relevant legislature should debate any functions being given to a new public authority.
- c. **Transferring EU legislative powers (i.e. powers to make delegated or implementing acts) to a UK body.** Relevant legislatures must debate the delegation of legislative power and Government's choices about who can exercise it and how.
- d. **Relates to fees.** The Government recognises that the decision whether to charge for a particular function or service is a choice with impact on industry or individuals.
- e. **Creating or amending criminal offences.** This has important implications for citizens.
- f. **Creating or amending a power to legislate.** This involves sub-delegation. Parliament must debate the delegation of legislative power and choices about where it is held.

48. The made affirmative procedure will be available as a contingency should there be insufficient time for the draft affirmative procedure for certain instruments before exit day. The risk that statutory instruments made under the made affirmative procedure could be overturned must be balanced with the need to have a functioning statute book on exit day. The House of Lords Constitution Committee, whilst urging restraint, accepted that *'in a very limited number of circumstances there may be grounds for seeking to fast-track parliamentary procedure of draft affirmative instruments'*.<sup>9</sup> The Government believes that the exceptional circumstances of withdrawing from the EU might necessitate the use of the made affirmative procedure so the Bill allows for this as a contingency.

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<sup>9</sup> The House of Lords Constitution Committee fifteenth report 'Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards'  
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/116/11607.htm>

## **Explanatory Memoranda**

49. The Government has decided that all explanatory memoranda accompanying statutory instruments made by Ministers of the Crown under powers in the Bill must, in addition to the usual requirements for the contents of an explanatory memorandum, also:

- explain what any relevant EU law did before exit day,
- explain what is being changed or done and why, and
- include a statement that the minister considers that the instrument does no more than what is appropriate. This builds on a suggestion of the House of Lords Constitution Committee.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> [The 'Great Repeal Bill' and delegated powers](#), 9th Report of Session 2016-17

## **Clause 8 and Schedule 2, Part 2: Complying with international obligations**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown and Devolved Authorities

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative or affirmative

### **Context and Purpose**

50. This power enables the UK to continue complying with its international obligations. The UK's withdrawal from the EU could, without remedial action, lead to unintended breaches of our international obligations. This arises notwithstanding the conversion of directly applicable EU law and the preservation provided by the Bill; in fact, elements of the conversion and preservation could place the UK unintentionally in breach of our international obligations.

### **Justification**

51. Any unintended breaches of international law which might arise from our withdrawal from the EU are similar to the failures and deficiencies which the correcting power in Clause 7 will be used to correct. However, the power in Clause 7 may only be used where there is a failure or deficiency in "retained EU law". The Government considers that it is prudent to take a separate power on international obligations in order to deal with any potential breaches of our international obligations which might arise other than in "retained EU law". This power will, though, only be exercisable where the breach of our international obligations arises from the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

52. For example, the UK is a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Transfrontier Television. However, a break clause (Article. 27) says that EU member states are to implement EU law instead - which is Directive 2010/13/EU (known as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)). On this basis, the UK has never actually implemented the Convention, but implemented the AVMSD instead. Once we leave the EU, potentially even if we were to negotiate ongoing participation in the framework of AVMSD, we would regardless no longer benefit from the exemption in the Convention, as we would not be a member state. We could then be in breach of our international law obligations by not having implemented the Convention. We could use this power in clause 8 to implement it, which could involve changes other than to retained EU law.

53. The restrictions which constrain the scope of the power in Clause 7 also apply to this power. The only exception is that it can impose taxation, but only where that is an appropriate way of preventing or remedying a breach. Additional restrictions apply to the use of the power by a devolved authority.

54. As with the correcting power in Clause 7, breaches here could arise in areas in which the UK is considering pursuing a negotiated outcome with the EU. It would be unwise to legislate in primary legislation to provide for the implementation of our preferred negotiated outcome and thereby 'show our hand' to those with whom we are negotiating in the EU.

### **Scrutiny**

55. The procedures here mirror, as appropriate, the scrutiny procedures for the correcting power in Clause 7.

## **Clause 9 and Schedule 2, Part 3: Power to implement withdrawal agreement**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown and Devolved Authorities

***Power exercised by:*** regulations by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative or affirmative

### **Context and purpose**

56. On 29th March 2017, the Prime Minister wrote to the President of the European Council notifying our intention to leave the EU. Under the terms of Article 50, the UK intends to negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement with the EU.

57. Once a withdrawal agreement is reached, it is likely that parts of it will require legislative changes to implement it in domestic law. To ensure that the UK is in a position to fulfil its obligations under the agreement, it is essential that this implementing legislation is in place before the withdrawal agreement comes into force on exit day. The Bill provides a limited power to enable the withdrawal agreement to be implemented as appropriate. This is a separate process from that by which the Government will bring forward a motion on the final agreement to be voted on by both Houses of Parliament before it is concluded.

58. The Government has already committed to introducing a number of other Bills during the course of the next two years to give effect to our exit. These are intended to implement significant policy changes and Parliament will have the fullest possible opportunity to scrutinise this legislation.

### **Devolution**

59. The withdrawal agreement affects the whole of the UK and the implementing power will be conferred on the devolved authorities in relation to domestic legislation within areas of devolved competence.



## **Justification**

60. It is essential that the UK is in a position to fulfil its obligations under a withdrawal agreement by exit day. Any necessary legislative changes will therefore need to have been made before exit day. Whilst the nature and scale of the legislative changes required are as yet unknown, it is important that we are in a position to start preparing the statute book as soon as possible once a deal with the EU is reached. We note that the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution recognised that the Bill might include a delegated power to implement the result of the UK's negotiations with the EU.

61. To get us ready for exit day, this power enables Government and, where it is within their competence, the devolved authorities to make legislative changes appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. To ensure that a range of negotiated outcomes can be catered for, the power will enable the Government and devolved authorities to do what an Act of Parliament can do, subject to certain restrictions. The power can repeal, alter or replace the law, including retained EU law. Depending on the final agreement and subject to the passage of the Bill, Government might also need to subsequently amend the Bill itself in order to reflect the outcome of negotiations.

62. The exact use of the power will of course depend on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. The power needs, however, to be sufficiently flexible to enable the agreed arrangements to be properly implemented in domestic law. It could, for example, enable functions currently carried out by an EU regulator to be transferred to an existing regulator in the UK or set up a new body to perform functions that were previously carried out by an EU body. Depending on what we agree, it could provide the legal underpinning for a registration system in the UK for products or provide a mechanism so that existing standards would continue to be protected in the UK.

63. The power will however be limited to making provisions that should be in place for day one of exit in order to ensure an orderly withdrawal from the EU.

### **Limiting the Power**

64. As indicated above, the power is inherently constrained by the terms of the withdrawal agreement and by what provision the minister considers should be in place on or before exit day. In addition, the Government has been clear that it will bring forward a motion on the final agreement to be voted on by both Houses of Parliament before it is concluded. As with the correcting power in Clause 7, this power cannot be used to impose or increase taxation, to create criminal offences subject to a term of imprisonment of more than two years, amend or repeal the Human Rights Act, or make retrospective provision.

65. The power is subject to a sunset clause and it can only be used up to exit day: it is not an ongoing power but one designed to implement parts of a withdrawal agreement (which has been approved by Parliament) that should be in place on or before exit day.

### **Scrutiny**

66. Regulations made under the power to implement the withdrawal agreement will be subject to affirmative or negative procedure and the scrutiny procedures are based on those for the correcting power in Clause 7, with similar triggers for the affirmative procedure. Regulations modifying the Act itself would also be subject to the affirmative procedure.

## **Clause 11/Schedule 3, Part 1: Powers to make exceptions to limit on devolved competence to modify retained EU law**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown and a devolved authority acting jointly

***Power exercised by:*** Order in Council

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** double affirmative

### **Context and Purpose**

67. Clause 11 contains powers to introduce exceptions to the new tests for legislative competence in relation to retained EU law that the Bill applies to the Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and National Assembly for Wales. Schedule 3 Part 1 contains equivalent powers in respect of the new tests for executive competence that apply to Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers, and Northern Irish Ministers and departments.

68. The Bill will replicate the common UK frameworks created by EU law in UK law, and maintain the scope of devolved decision making powers immediately after exit. This will be a transitional arrangement to provide certainty after exit and allow intensive discussion and consultation with devolved authorities on where lasting common frameworks are needed.

### **Justification**

69. The purpose of the power is to provide an appropriate mechanism to broaden the parameters of devolved competence in respect of retained EU law. It therefore adopts a similar approach to the established procedure within the devolution legislation for devolving new powers (e.g. s.30 orders in the Scotland Act 1998). Without the power it would be necessary for the UK Parliament to pass primary legislation (having sought Legislative Consent Motions from the relevant devolved legislatures) in order to release areas from the new competence limit.

## **Scrutiny**

70. The power will be exercisable by Order in Council and it will require the approval of both Houses of Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.

## **Clause 14: Power to specify ‘exit day’**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** no procedure

### **Purpose and Context**

71. This power enables the Government to specify the date and time of ‘exit day’ for the purposes of the Bill.

### **Justification**

72. Exit day will be dependent on the withdrawal negotiations with the EU.

### **Scrutiny**

73. This power has no procedure attached to it. The power is limited to only specifying a date and time which will itself be subject to negotiations between the UK and the EU.

## **Clause 17(1): Power to make consequential provision**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative procedure

### **Context and Purpose**

74. This clause contains a power to make such consequential provision as is considered appropriate in consequence of this Bill.

### **Justification**

75. The powers conferred by this clause are wide, but there are various precedents for such provisions including section 92 of the Immigration Act 2016, section 213 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, section 115 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 59 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and 41 section 73(2) of the 2014 Act.

76. This Bill creates a substantial change to the legal framework of the UK. The Government is unable to identify, at this early stage, all the possible consequential provisions required. In the circumstances, it would be prudent for the Bill to contain a power to deal with consequential provisions by secondary legislation. The power is limited to making amendments consequential to the contents of the Bill itself, and not to consequences of withdrawal from the EU which are addressed by powers already discussed.

77. A statutory instrument made under this power could, for example, make provision on whether retained direct EU legislation should be treated as primary or subordinate legislation for the purposes of another specified enactment.

## **Scrutiny**

78. We anticipate a large number of fairly straightforward changes, including to primary legislation, will be needed in consequence of this Bill. The negative procedure would apply to a statutory instrument made under this power. It is naturally constrained to consequences coming out of the wider Bill, which Parliament is able to scrutinise in full.

## **Clause 17(5): Power to make transitional, transitory or saving provision**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** affirmative or negative or no procedure

### **Context and Purpose**

79. This clause contains a standard power for a Minister of the Crown to make transitional, transitory or saving provision in connection with the bringing into force of provisions of the Bill.

### **Justification**

80. By repealing the ECA 1972 and converting applicable EU law into UK law, the Bill will create a substantial change in the UK's statute book. This is unprecedented and, as such, it is prudent to enable provisions that allow for a smooth commencement of the Bill's provisions. For example, the Bill removes the UK from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice but the UK will remain subject to its jurisdiction up until the very moment of exit. The power could make transitional provision for court cases still ongoing on exit day. It could also be used to save section 2(3) of the ECA, which authorises payments to the EU, in respect of liabilities incurred whilst the UK was a member state. This could include outstanding transfers of customs duties and sugar levy payments collected by the UK on behalf of the EU up until exit day.



## **Scrutiny**

81. The negative, affirmative or no procedure can be used for statutory instruments made under this power (see paragraph 10 of Schedule 7). Where the Minister making regulations under this power considers that to do so with no Parliamentary procedure would be inappropriate and either the affirmative or the negative procedure would be appropriate, then that procedure must apply. This reflects that while the commonly accepted approach is to have no procedure for such statutory instruments, the unique circumstances of the Bill warrant a different approach. The Government thinks it proper that uses of the power, such as the example given above of a saving provision enabling payments to the EU, should be subject to a scrutiny procedure.

## **Clause 19: Power to make commencement provisions**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** no procedure

### **Context and Purpose**

82. This clause contains a standard power for a Minister of the Crown to bring provisions of the Bill into force by commencement regulations.

### **Justification**

83. As is usual, it may be sensible for parts of the Bill to commence at different times, where the commencement is not already stated. This power enables that.

### **Scrutiny**

84. As is usual with commencement powers, regulations made under this clause are not subject to any parliamentary procedure. Parliament has approved the principle of the provisions to be commenced by enacting them; commencement by regulations enables the provisions to be brought into force at the appropriate time.

## **Schedule 1 Paragraph 1(2)(b) and 3: Challenges to validity of retained EU law**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** affirmative

### **Context and Purpose**

85. The Bill provides at paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1 that on or after exit day there will be no right in domestic law to bring a challenge to retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before EU exit, an EU instrument was invalid. However, this is subject to an exception in paragraph 1(2)(b) which sets out that a Minister of the Crown may by regulations specify or describe kinds of challenges that may be made to the validity of EU instruments.

86. Paragraph 1(3) sets out that the regulations may also provide that a challenge which would have been brought against an EU institution can instead be brought against a public authority in the United Kingdom.

### **Justification**

87. Currently the European Court of Justice can declare an EU instrument invalid. However, the domestic courts have no jurisdiction to declare such an instrument to be invalid. The power in paragraph 1(2)(b) will enable a Minister of the Crown to specify or describe the kinds of challenges that may be made to the validity of EU instruments. This will ensure that instruments which are converted on exit can be still be challenged post exit on the grounds that they are invalid. Paragraph 1(3) will enable the minister to provide that the relevant challenge can be brought against a domestic public authority.

## **Scrutiny**

88. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 7 provides that regulations made under paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1 will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure (or made affirmative as a contingency). Regulations made pursuant to this power can provide for new categories of challenges in or domestic justice system. The power can only be used to confer rights to challenge EU instruments that have been converted through the Bill. The Government considers that any change of this kind should be subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure.

## **Schedule 4, Part 1: Charging in connection with certain new functions**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown and Devolved Authorities

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative or affirmative

### **Context and Purpose**

89. This power can mitigate the burden on the general taxpayer to pick up the cost of all functions transferred from the EU to the UK, or new functions created to deal with deficiencies or breaches of international obligations, or to implement the withdrawal agreement. It enables UK ministers and devolved authorities to create fees and charges in connection with functions that public bodies in the UK take on exit, where appropriate, and also modify them in future. Whilst this power will not be used in connection with every function being repatriated, it ensures ministers have the flexibility to ensure the burden of specific industry-related costs does not fall onto the general taxpayer (including in cases where EU institutions currently charge). It should be noted that this could include the creation of tax-like charges, which go beyond recovering the direct cost of the provision of a service to a specific firm or individual, including to allow for potential cross-subsidisation or to cover the wider functions and running costs of a public body, or to lower regulatory costs for small or medium sized enterprises.

90. This power is capable of being used to confer a power on public authorities to create their own fees and charges schemes. Some public authorities already have this ability in connection with their existing domestic functions, for example the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. The procedural requirements that are set out in the regulations conferring that power would allow it to be used in a restricted way. The regulations conferring such a power on a public authority would themselves be subject to Treasury consent and the affirmative procedure.

## **Justification**

91. This power is designed to allow flexibility in how new Government functions are funded. It enables the creation and modification of fees or other charges so the costs of Government services do not have to always fall on the taxpayer.

92. The powers in clauses 7 to 9 can be used to provide for some fees, but they do not allow for the level of a fee to be amended on an ongoing basis in the future (e.g. to be updated in line with inflation annually, or to be reduced because the cost of delivering the function has fallen).

93. In addition, because of the restriction on using the powers in clauses 7 and 9 to create taxes, they do not allow for the creation of fees and charges that cross-subsidise (as is the case with various other UK fees and charges), or to cover the costs of the broader rule-making and compliance functions of a regulator. For example UK banks pay a levy, limited in scope to UK-incorporated firms, to provide deposit protection to their customers, whilst EEA banks are covered by the home State, (some of which charge and some of which subsidise this service via general taxation); this power could be used to create a levy on these firms operating in the UK if appropriate.

## **Limitations on the use of the power**

94. The power can also only be used to create a new fee or charge in connection with functions given to ministers or bodies under powers in any of clauses 7 to 9 (those powers are time limited and connected to withdrawal); there will, therefore, be a finite number of new functions to which fees or charges can be attached, connected to the UK's withdrawal from the EU. If the UK government or devolved authorities set up a new regime under new primary legislation after exit (even if it is in an area formerly governed by EU law), any new fees or charges would need to be established as part of that new primary legislation.

95. In addition, for the UK Government, Treasury consent is required for the creation of a new fee or charge, further ensuring departments justify their case. This constraint does not apply to the devolved authorities, in accordance with standard practice around financial arrangements for devolution (although devolved authorities could of course impose their own similar constraints administratively to mirror the requirement for Treasury consent). Devolved authorities will only be able to exercise the power in relation to functions of Ministers of the Crown or functions of bodies that operate outside of the relevant territory with the consent of a Minister of the Crown.

## **Scrutiny**

96. An affirmative scrutiny procedure would apply in the UK Parliament or the devolved legislatures, depending where the regulations are made, where departments provide for the charging of new fees or charges. The Government recognises that the decision whether to charge for a particular function or not is a policy choice with impact on industry or individuals so believes a higher level of scrutiny is warranted. However the negative procedure would apply where a department later amends the amount of those fees or charges. The affirmative scrutiny procedure would also apply where a minister sub-delegates the power in paragraph 1 of Schedule 4. The Government anticipates that Parliament and devolved legislatures will want full assurance that legislative sub-delegation is done in an appropriate manner.

## **Schedule 4, Part 1: Power to set further circumstances in which devolved authorities may exercise the charging power**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative

### **Context and Purpose**

97. The devolved authorities can use the fees or charges power, without seeking Minister of the Crown consent, in connection with functions that are either (a) conferred on a devolved minister or department or (b) are matters within the devolved authority's legislative competence (or are matters which have been transferred by the relevant devolved authority) and are being conferred on a body that only operates within the relevant territory. Devolved authorities will also be able to set fees or charges in other circumstances if the function is within their legislative competence or if they conferred the function the fee or charge relates to under the powers in the Bill and if they have consent from a Minister of the Crown.

98. There may, however, be other circumstances where it would be more appropriate for the devolved administration to set the fees than the Minister of the Crown (or for them to do so without Minister of the Crown consent). The Bill therefore provides a power for Ministers of the Crown to specify (a) additional circumstances where devolved authorities can use the power or (b) where consent requirements should be disapplied.

### **Justification**

99. There will be some additional circumstances where it may be appropriate for devolved authorities to be able to set fees or charges (or to do so without needing Minister of the Crown consent). For example, some bodies might operate across different territories. There is no single approach to defining the particular additional circumstances and particular additional bodies which should be treated as devolved for the purposes of exercising the power.



100. In some cases, bodies operating across more than one territory are funded by both the UK Government and the devolved administrations. Different administrations might have different approaches to charging: for example one devolved authority may want to charge for the function and the other to fund it themselves. In addition, where fees are set on a cost-recovery basis, a devolved authority that is responsible for funding the body within its territory would likely wish to have responsibility for updating relevant fees as they will be responsible making up any shortfall if the level is set too low.

101. We also need to be able to account for circumstances where, for example, a function is conferred on a UK body but is only undertaken in a devolved territory. In such circumstances it might be appropriate for the devolved authority to take on responsibility for fees and charges.

### **Limitation**

102. The power is naturally limited by the scope of the charging power itself. It can only prescribe circumstances in which devolved authorities have competence to use the power.

### **Scrutiny**

103. The negative scrutiny procedure would apply.

## **Schedule 4, Part 2: Power to modify pre-exit fees and charges**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown and Devolved Authorities

***Power exercised by:*** regulations made by statutory instrument

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** negative

### **Context and Purpose**

104. Over the past 40 years, numerous fees and charges have been made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act or section 56 of the Finance Act 1973 in connection with EU obligations. This power ensures that where Government continues to provide the service post-exit, those fees and charges continue to be amendable post-exit in the same way as they were pre-exit, even though the powers under which they were created will have gone. This includes making modifications to the amount, methodology or structure of the charges, or revoking them. However, it would not allow charging for new things. For example, as the cost of animal health inspection fees varies in line with inflation, this power would allow the Government to ensure that these fees are uprated to allow the relevant agency to continue to cover its costs and prevent a drain on the public finances.

### **Justification**

105. This is, in effect, keeping the current powers for limited purposes. Where a public body continues to exercise a function it is already charging for, it should be able to continue or revoke or adjust fees to the same extent as is currently possible.

### **Limitations**

106. This power is only exercisable in relation to existing fees and charges, it cannot be used to set up new schemes. Moreover it cannot be used to amend primary legislation. This power is modelled on these two pre-exit powers. So where it is used to modify legislation created through the ECA, it cannot impose or

increase taxation, in line with the constraint at paragraph 1(1)(a) of the ECA. And a Minister of the Crown needs Treasury consent to make certain kinds of provision, in line with section 56 of the Finance Act.

### **Scrutiny**

107. The negative procedure would apply in the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures, reflecting the procedure under the current powers. This power only allows existing fees or charges to be amended up or down, or altered in other ways such as being split into two parts (for example an annual charge and a daily one, or a one-off fee for an application and an annual charge). Where the power is exercised by UK ministers there are detailed directions within Managing Public Money setting out how a fee or charge should be calculated.

## **Schedule 5, Part 1: Power to make exceptions on duty to publish retained EU law**

***Power conferred on:*** Minister of the Crown

***Power exercised by:*** direction

***Parliamentary Procedure:*** none

### **Context and Purpose**

108. Publishing all UK legislation is a core part of the remit of Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), part of The National Archives, and the Office of the Queen's Printer for Scotland. Retained EU law needs to be accessible after exit day. The Queen's Printer will therefore have a duty to publish EU instruments that could form part of the law converted by the Bill. There is also a duty to publish particular key Treaties, and the Queen's Printer will have the ability to publish other EU instruments and documents which may be relevant to our law or useful going forward.

109. It is not considered appropriate to define the Queen's Printer's duty by reference to "retained direct EU legislation" (which is defined in clause 14 of the Bill), as this could involve the Queen's Printer having to determine the effect of the provisions in the Bill. However, not all instruments caught by the duty will be relevant after we have left the EU - for example, many Justice and Home Affairs measures will be "exempt EU instruments" not converted by the Bill - and it may not be helpful to require that all of them be published. This power enables a minister to give a direction to the Queen's Printer that they do not consider particular documents to be retained direct EU legislation, and the Queen's Printer will not need to publish these documents.

### **Justification**

110. The power is a practical solution to prevent unnecessary publication by the Queen's Printer, helping save resources and time and minimise the risk of confusion caused by printing irrelevant documents. The power does not give ministers the ability to determine what is and is not retained direct EU legislation, and any directions must be published.

### **Scrutiny**

111. Given this is a limited, administrative power, there is no parliamentary scrutiny procedure attached. Any direction will, however, need to be published so there will be complete transparency as to the use of the power.

## **Schedule 5, Part 2: Power to make provision about judicial notice and admissibility.**

**Power conferred on:** *Minister of the Crown*

**Power exercised by:** *regulations made under statutory instrument*

**Parliamentary Procedure:** *affirmative*

### **Context and Purpose**

112. The power enables ministers to make provisions on judicial notice and evidential rules on EU law, the EEA agreement, and retained EU law.

### **Justification**

113. The ECA contains provisions requiring that judicial notice be taken of certain aspects of EU law (such as the EU Treaties), and determining how evidence of EU instruments may be given in domestic courts. Notwithstanding the repeal of the ECA, these provisions would in any event need to be supplemented to take into account the change in our legal landscape following exit. This is similar to the approach used for the civil and criminal procedure rules. These are dealt with by secondary legislation made by the respective Rules Committees.

### **Scrutiny**

114. The affirmative procedure applies to this power. The content of these regulations will deal with matters that are currently set out in the ECA and may be of particular interest to Parliament.

## ANNEX A - SAMPLE DRAFTING

Set out below are two sample draft provisions for statutory instruments that illustrate two of the corresponding examples above. These illustrate how corrections **might** look in a statutory instrument but, as with the narrative examples, should not be taken as an indication of actual Government policy or the UK's preferred position in the negotiations with the EU. Equally, different approaches might be taken in drafting.

More sample draft statutory instruments will become available to Parliament during the course of the Bill's passage.

## **SAMPLE DRAFTING EXAMPLE 1**

The draft regulations below show how a reciprocal arrangement might be revoked.

### **The Return of Cultural Objects (Revocation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018**

The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018([a]), makes the following Regulations.

#### **Citation and commencement**

1. These Regulations may be cited as the Return of Cultural Objects (Revocation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 and come into force on [exit day].

#### **Revocation**

2. The following Regulations are revoked—

- (a) The Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994([b]); and
- (b) The Return of Cultural Objects (Amendment) Regulations 2015([c]).

#### **EXPLANATORY NOTE**

(This note is not part of the Regulations)

These Regulations are made in exercise of the power in section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 in order to address a deficiency arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. They revoke the Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 and the Return of Cultural Objects (Amendment) Regulations 2015, which made provision for reciprocal arrangements between the United Kingdom and EU member States.



([a])

([b]) S.I. 1994/501, amended by S.I. 2015/1926.

([c]) S.I. 2015/1926.

## **SAMPLE DRAFTING EXAMPLE 2**

The draft regulations below show how various corrections might be necessary to transfer functions.

### **The Chemicals (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018**

The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018([a]), makes the following Regulations.

#### **Citation and Commencement**

1. These Regulations may be cited as the Chemicals (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 and come into force on exit day.

#### **Interpretation**

2. In these Regulations, “exit day” means ...

### **PART 1**

#### **Amendment of Subordinate Legislation**

#### **Amendment of the Biocidal Products and Chemicals (Appointment of Authorities and Enforcement ) Regulations 2013**

3.—(1) The Biocidal Products and Chemicals (Appointment of Authorities and Enforcement) Regulations 2013([b]) are amended as follows.

(2) In Regulation x,...

### **PART 2**

#### **Amendment of Biocidal Product Regulation**

## **Amendment of the Biocidal Products Regulation (EU) 528/2012**

**4.**—(1) The Biocidal Products Regulation (EU) 528/2012([c]) is amended as follows.

### **PART 3**

#### **Amendment of CLP Regulation**

## **Amendment of the Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (EC) 1272/2008**

**5.** The Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (EC) 1272/2008([d]) is amended as follows.

### **Amendment of Article 1 (Purpose and Scope)**

**6.**—(1) In Article 1(1)—

- (a) in the opening words, omit “as well as the free movement of substances, mixtures and articles, as referred to in Article 4(8)”;
  - (b) in point (a), for “harmonising” substitute “establishing”;
  - (c) in point (c), for “the Agency” substitute “the Executive”;
  - (d) point (d) is omitted;
  - (e) in point (e) , for “points (c) and (d)” substitute “point (c) “.
- (2) In Article 1(2), in point (d), omit “Community”.
- (3) Omit Article 1(4).

### **Amendment of Article 2 (Definitions)**

**7.** In Article 2—

- (a) for paragraph 23 substitute—  
“23. the Executive” means the Health and Safety Executive;”;
- (b) for paragraph 24, substitute  
[“24. competent authority” means the authority or authorities or bodies established by the Secretary of State to carry out the obligations arising from this Regulation;”.]

### **Amendment of Article 4 (General obligations to classify, label and package)**

**8.** In Article 4(3), omit “harmonised”.

### **Amendment of Article 10 (Concentration limits and M factors)**

**9.** In Article 10—

- (a) in paragraph 4, omit “harmonised”; and
- (b) in paragraph 7, for “Agency” substitute “Executive”.

**Amendment of Article 16 (Classification of substances included in the inventory)**

**10.** In Article 16—

- (a) in paragraph 1, for “Agency” substitute “Executive”; and
- (b) in paragraph 2, omit “harmonised”.

**Amendment of Article 17 (General rules (hazard labelling))**

**11.** In Article 17, for paragraph 2 substitute—

“2. The label must be written in English.”.

**Amendment of Article 23 (Derogations from labelling requirements for special cases)**

**12.** In the heading to Article 23, omit “Derogations from”.

**Amendment of Article 24 (Request for use of an alternative chemical name)**

**13.** In Article 24—

- (a) in paragraph 2, for “Commission” substitute “Secretary of State”, and
- (b) in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6, for “Agency” substitute “Executive”.

**Amendment of Article 29 (Exemptions from labelling and packaging requirements)**

**14.** In Article 29—

- (a) in paragraph 1, omit “in the languages of the Member State in which the substance or mixture is placed on the market”; and
- (b) in paragraph 5, for “Commission” substitute “Secretary of State” and for “Agency” substitute “Executive”.

**Revocation of Article 34 (Report on communication on safe use of chemicals)**

**15.** Omit Article 34.

**Amendment of Article 36 (Harmonisation of classification and labelling of substances)**

**16.**—(1) In the heading to Article 36, omit “Harmonisation of”.

(2) In Article 36—

- (a) in paragraph 1, omit “harmonised”;
- (b) in paragraph 2, omit “harmonised”; and
- (c) in paragraph 3, omit “harmonised” and “at Community level”.

**Amendment of Article 37 (Procedure for harmonisation of classification and labelling of substances)**

**17.**—(1) In the heading to Article 37, omit “harmonisation of”.

(2) In Article 37—

- (a) in paragraph 1—
  - (i) for “Agency” substitute “Executive”; and
  - (ii) omit “harmonised”;
- (b) in paragraph 2—
  - (i) for “Agency” substitute “Executive”; and
  - (ii) omit “harmonised”;
- (c) in paragraph 3—
  - (i) for “Commission” substitute “Secretary of State”; and
  - (ii) omit “harmonised”.
- (d) in paragraph 4—
  - (i) for the words from “Committee” to “Regulation EC no 1907/2006” substitute “Executive”,
  - (ii) for “Agency” substitute “Executive”, and
  - (iii) for “Commission” substitute “Secretary of State”;
- (e) in paragraph 5—
  - (i) for “Commission”, in both places it appears, substitute “Secretary of State”,
  - (ii) omit “harmonisation of”, and
  - (iii) for “Agency” substitute “Executive”;
- (f) in paragraph 6, omit “harmonised” and the words after “competent authority”.

**Amendment of heading to Article 38 (content of opinions etc)**

**18.** In the heading to Article 38, omit “harmonised”.

#### **Amendment to Article 40 (Obligation to notify the Agency)**

- 19.**—(1) In the heading to Article 40, for “Agency” substitute “Executive”.  
(2) In Article 40, for “Agency”, in each place it appears, substitute “Executive”.

#### **Amendment to Article 41 (Agreed entries)**

- 20.** In Article 41, for “Agency” substitute “Executive”.

#### **Amendment to Article 42 (The classification and labelling inventory)**

- 21.** In Article 42—  
(a) for “Agency”, in each place it appears, substitute “Executive”;  
(b) in paragraph 3, in point (a), omit “harmonised” and “at Community level”.

#### **Amendment to Article 43 (Appointment of authorities etc)**

- 22.** For Article 43 substitute—

“**43.** The Secretary of State [must/may] appoint the competent authority or authorities responsible for proposals for classification and labelling and responsible for enforcement of the obligations set out in this Regulation.”.

#### **Amendment to Article 44 (Helpdesk)**

- 23.** In Article 44, for “Member States shall establish national helpdesks” substitute “The Secretary of State [must/may] establish a helpdesk”.

#### **Amendment to Article 45 (Bodies responsible for receiving information)**

- 24.** In Article 45—  
(a) in paragraph 1, for “Member States” substitute “The Secretary of State” and for “Agency” substitute “Executive”;  
(b) in paragraph 2, for “Member State” substitute “Secretary of State”;  
(c) omit paragraph 4.

#### **Omission of Article 46 (Enforcement and Reporting)**

- 25.** Omit Article 46.

### **Omission of Article 47 (Penalties for non-compliance)**

**26.** Omit Article 47.

### **Amendment of Article 49 (Obligation to maintain information and requests for information)**

**27.** In Article 49(3)—

- (a) for “Agency”, in each place it appears, substitute “Executive”;
- (b) omit “or the enforcement authorities of a member State in which the supplier is established”.

### **Amendment of Article 50**

**28.** In Article 50—

- (a) omit paragraph 1;
- (b) in paragraph 2, in point (a), for “Agency” substitute “Executive”;
- (c) in -paragraph 2, in point (b), for the words from “helpdesks established t” to the end substitute “helpdesk established under Article 44”.

### **Omission of Article 51**

**29.** Omit Article 51.

## **PART 4**

Amendment of the Export and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Regulation

### **Amendment of the Export and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Regulation (EU) 649/2012**

**30.—**g) The Export and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Regulation (EU) 649/2012([e]) is amended as follows.

Signatory text

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([a])

([b]) S.I. 2013/1506.

- ([c]) OJ No L ...2012, p xx
- ([d]) OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p1.
- ([e]) OJ No L xxx, 2012, p x.

**Department for Exiting the European Union**  
**13<sup>th</sup> July 2017**



## Eitem 4.9



Department  
for Exiting the  
European Union

# The Repeal Bill

## Factsheet 5: Devolution

[repeal-bill@dexeu.gov.uk](mailto:repeal-bill@dexeu.gov.uk)

### Devolution

The Government is committed to ensuring that withdrawal from the EU is a successful and smooth process for the whole of the UK.

At present, EU rules create a consistent approach across the UK in a range of policy areas. This protects the freedom of businesses to operate across the UK single market, and the UK's ability to fulfil international obligations and protect common resources.

As powers are repatriated from the EU, our guiding principle is that no new barriers to living and doing business within our own union are created when we leave the EU. We will therefore need to examine these powers carefully to determine the level best placed to take decisions on these issues.

The Government expects that the return of powers from the EU will lead to a significant increase in the decision making powers of the devolved administrations.

### Key facts

- The Bill will replicate the common UK frameworks created by EU law in UK law, and maintain the scope of devolved decision making powers immediately after exit. This means that any decisions that the devolved authorities can take before exit, they can continue to take after exit.
- This will be a transitional arrangement to provide certainty after exit and allow intensive discussion and consultation with devolved authorities on where lasting common frameworks are or are not needed.
- Where it is determined that a common approach is not required, the Bill provides a power to lift the limit on devolved competence in that area.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### **Aren't you just re-reserving powers? Isn't this a Westminster land grab?**

- No. As the PM has made clear, under this Bill decisions that are currently made by devolved administrations will continue to be made by the devolved administrations. That is what is set out in the Bill.
- There will then be discussions about where lasting common frameworks are or are not needed. It is the expectation of the Government that the outcome of this process will be a significant increase in the decision making power of each devolved authority.
- This is about ensuring that decision making powers returning from the EU are allocated within the UK in a way that works - ensuring that no new barriers to living and doing business within the UK are created.
- This will be vital if we are to protect the UK internal market, and ensure we have the ability to strike the best trade deals around the world, protect our common resources, and fulfil our international obligations. This is in the interest of citizens in every part of the UK.

### **What input have the devolved administrations had on the development of the devolution provisions in the Bill?**

- The Government has discussed the Repeal Bill with the devolved administrations, and the Bill and White Paper were shared with the devolved administrations in advance of publication. UK Government officials have been engaging with their colleagues in the devolved administrations on the Bill and to help determine the scale of the changes needed to correct the statute book across the UK.



Cadeiryddion y Pwyllgorau  
Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru  
Bae Caerdydd  
CF99 1NA

11 Gorffennaf 2017

Annwyl Gadeirydd

### **Gweithredu Deddf Cymru 2017**

Fel y gwyddoch, mae Deddf Cymru 2017 yn darparu bod yn rhaid i Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru benodi, drwy reoliadau, 'brif ddiwrnod penodedig', pan ddaw'r model cadw pwerau newydd i rym. Mae'r Deddf hefyd yn darparu bod yn rhaid i'r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol ymgynghori â mi, fel Llywydd, cyn gwneud rheoliadau o'r fath.

Amgaeaf lythyr gan yr Ysgrifennydd Gwladol yn nodi ei fwriad i bennu **6 Ebrill 2018** fel y prif ddiwrnod penodedig. Mae hefyd yn nodi ei fod yn bwriadu cychwyn y rhan fwyaf o'r darpariaethau sy'n weddill yn Neddf Cymru ar yr un pryd.

Byddwch yn sylwi o lythyr yr Ysgrifennydd Gwladol ei fod yn bwriadu ysgrifennu eto o ran goblygiadau'r sesiwn Seneddol ddwy flynedd i'r broses Cydsyniad Deddfwriaethol. Byddaf yn rhannu'r llythyr hwn gyda chi maes o law.

Buaswn yn ddiolchgar pe gallech roi gwybod i mi erbyn dydd Gwener 28 Gorffennaf a oes gan eich pwyllgorau unrhyw sylwadau i'w gwneud ar gynigion yr Ysgrifennydd Gwladol.

Yn gywir

Elin Jones AC  
Llywydd

Amg

Croesewir gohebiaeth yn Gymraeg neu Saesneg / We welcome correspondence in Welsh or English

Elin Jones AM  
Presiding Officer  
National Assembly for Wales  
Cardiff Bay  
CF99 1NA

Ref: 250SUB 17

10<sup>th</sup> July 2017

*Dear Elin,*

I am writing regarding the implementation of the Wales Act 2017. The Act provides for the Secretary of State to appoint, through regulations, a “principal appointed day” (PAD) on which the new reserved powers model comes into force. The Act specifies that I consult the Welsh Ministers and the Assembly’s Presiding Officer before making regulations appointing the PAD. I am therefore writing to seek your views on my proposal to specify **6 April 2018 as the principal appointed day**.

Three key factors have informed my proposed date. Firstly, the need to implement the new reserved powers model of Welsh devolution as soon as practicable, to provide a clearer settlement and a well-defined division between devolved and reserved responsibilities. The lack of clarity that is a feature of the current Welsh devolution settlement continues to hinder our administrations working together as effectively as they might.

The 2017 Act requires the PAD to be at least four months after the regulations appointing the date are made. Making these regulations this autumn would provide Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and both our governments with sufficient notice to prepare for the new model.

Secondly, as you know the new devolved taxes - the Land Transaction Tax and Landfill Disposals Tax - come on stream on 6 April 2018. Bringing the reserved powers model into force on the same day would deliver a strong message that Welsh devolution has come of age.


Thirdly, we need to be clear about the model of Welsh devolution which applies as we prepare for our exit from the European Union. Implementing the reserved powers model in April 2018 provides us with sufficient time to make the necessary preparations before exit day.

I also propose to commence most of the remaining sections of the Wales Act 2017 in the same order. These sections devolve further powers to the National Assembly and the Welsh Ministers. The devolution of these powers is already reflected in the reserved powers model and so it makes sense to bring these sections into force at the same time.

The current session of Parliament will run until 2019, meaning the new reserved powers model would be brought force mid-way through the session. Clearly this has implications for any Legislative Consent Motions that may be required, and my officials are working to assess the impact. I will write to you once this analysis is completed. You will be aware that under Schedule 7 to the 2017 Act the current *conferred* powers model would continue to apply to those Assembly Bills which have passed Stage 1 by the PAD.

I would be grateful to receive your response by **4 September**, enabling the regulations to be drafted by early autumn. I am happy to share with you the regulations in draft before they are laid.

I am writing in similar terms to the First Minister of Wales.

Handwritten signature of Alun Cairns in black ink.

**Alun Cairns MP**  
Secretary of State for Wales  
Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru

Mae cyfyngiadau ar y ddogfen hon

Mae cyfyngiadau ar y ddogfen hon

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